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The era of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) is so 
significant in the development of the Less Developed 
Countries (LDCs) as was the era of the Industrial Revolu-
tion in the development of the now More Developed countries 
2 
(MDCs). It could be referred to as one of the major econo-
mic frontiers in the LDCs as is the computer frontier in 
the MDCs now. Naturally therefore, there are problems of 
distrust, fear of eventual crisis, uncertainty of the cor-
rect path and a pain in policy making. Coupled with the 
North/South delicate relationship, the MNC's (which mostly 
comes from the North) acceptability in LDCs (which are in 
the South) is of mixed feelings. 
In this paper therefore we shall explore some of the 
problems affecting the MNC/LDC relationship. Thus, among 
the questions to ponder on are what has been the impact, is 
it harmful or beneficial, do all MNCs have the same impact 
and how does each party interpret each impact? These ques~ 
tions often end up in accusations between MNCs and LDCs in 
general without devouring each other. But not without a 
loss of resources especially time and extra costs involved 
in speculations on each other as well as cushioning of un-
certain events that one party suspects of the other. 
These issues will be studied with particular reference 
to Kenya's economic development. We will want to know if 
the MNC's impact (if we are objective) on Kenya is contri-
butory to the economic development. To do this, we will 
need to know the overall performance of the Kenyan economy 
relative to its close neighbors, i.e., Tanzania and Uganda. 
This will be done in the first chapter of the paper. Then 
we shall need to observe closely the operation of MNCs in 
3 
the Kenyan industrial sector where they are dominant. This 
way, we can be able to weigh the proportion of the impact 
relative to the percentage of the economy that MNC's con-
trol. With such a background, we can be able to isolate 
particular important issues such as technological impact, 
urbanization impact, the impact on employment, education, 
politics and other related scenarios. Thus, what issues 
are involved from the point of view of both parties? 
In ~rder to objectively analyze these issues, specific 
evidences are searched for. These evidences, positive and 
negative effects, are put on balance as a means to help the 
final analysis on how to improve relationship between MNCs 
and LDCs. Thus, Chapter III will deal with labor related 
issues, Chapter IV will deal with rural issues and Chapter 
V deals with ideological issues. All these issues lead to 
a policy statement and conclusion in Chapter VI. 
Since MNCs and LDCs have fought without actually di-
vorcing each other, the interpretation is that the neces-
sity of coexistence of these parties is higher than their 
differences. There should be more gains to both than there 
are losses. Implicit therefore is that distribution of the 
gains is the problem. In any case, therefore, our view 
will be on how to patch up this problem, but not to show 
who is wrong. This view is amplified in the policy state-
ments whereby we shall suggest the criteria for handling 
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and evaluating the problems. From these criteria, probable 
policies are suggested. 
Due to the context of the paper (analysis of MNC im-
pact on Kenya) we will not be able to dwell with policies 
or criteria that MNCs should try. It therefore seems one-
sided but the theme is the same -- towards coexistence. 
We will also not be able to explore most of the other prob-
lems affecting underdevelopment such as population, cli-
mate, health, etc., because the MNCs relative impact on 
them is not very elaborate. Time and space also limit the 
exploration of other significant issues. However, those 
issues used here were seen as very vital especially as con-
cerns the Kenyan position. In sum therefore, this paper 
presents the MNCs impact in LDCs with a case study on Kenya 
but does not intend to show these problems as being common 
to all LDCs nor would the suggested policies be recommended 
for all LDCs. However, the overall theme should be repre-
sentative of issues affecting all LDCs. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis will mainly focus on the impact of the 
Multinational Corporations in Kenya. However, in order to 
grasp the effect of this impact, a survey of the national 
economy will be necessary for acquaintance. This will be 
in a comparative form to enable a broader perspective of 
the economy's relative weight and how much of the MNC 
effects it can handle. 
In Chapter II, the Industrial base is examined especi-
ally as it relates to the MNCs. This is essential as a 
providing link between the economy's overview and the part-
icular leading economic issues that have had the impact of 
the MNC. 
The later chapters deal with particular issues. Thus 
Chapter III deals with labor related issues, Chapter IV 
deals with issues affecting rural areas, Chapter v analyzes 
the ideological issues and Chapter VI is a policy statement 
together with the conclusion of the thesis. 
The major theme would be to show positive effects of 
most MNCs in Kenya's economic development in the background 
of alarming complaints against MNCs in Less Developed 
Countries (LDCs). The aim is to forage for a symbiotic 
approach that would foster economic growth between these 
two adversaries who by no means can never afford to leave 
exclusive of each other. 
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Even though the period of study provides reference 
from as early as 1930 to 1984, the main focus will concen-
trate on the period of the 1960s and 1970s. The 1960s pro-
vide a picture of investment strategies which are reflected 
in the 1970s' outcomes both in terms of output as well as 
further restructuring of investment strategies. It's from 
these counter effects that we shall base our evaluations 
and recommendations. 
The policy statement therefore makes a rejoinder of 
the issues towards a suggestion of a cohesive strategic 
economic development. 
Due to fewer local authors on the topic, I have used 
most of the material from foreign authors, government pub-
lications and news media literature as well as company pub-
lications which all the same represent reliable references. 
THE COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE APPROACH 
The theory of comparative advantage requires a nation 
to specialize, produce and export a commodity of which it 
has the least comparative disadvantage. Based on this 
theory, East Africa as a region will benefit much more from 
trade if it specialized in the production of agricultural 
crops such as tea, coffee, cotton, sisal, etc. In return, 
it should import capital items from industrial countries. 
Some studies have shown this to have been the case in 
that in 1937, Kenya's exports of the eight top agricultural 
products accounted for 76.9% of the total exports with cof-
fee, sisal and tea alone accounting for 48.1% while gold 
accounted for 10.7% (see Appendix 1 [Swainson 1980: 
46]). 1 And according to the Kenyan Bureau of statistics, 
agriculture alone accounted for 32.8% of the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) of the Monetary Sector in 1975, 30.8% in 1976 
and 29.7% in 1978 while manufacturing accounted for only 
12.5%, 14.1% and 16.2% respectively. This data is based on 
the total monetary sector of 76% in 1975, 76.2~ in 1976 and 
77.1% in 1978 of the GDP 2 (A Business International Re-
port 1980: 26). This reflection implies the emphasis of 
agriculture in East Africa. 
These data are also supported by the "Business Inter-
national s.A" research team whiah found out that Kenya's 
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imports "consist of mainly industrial machinery, crude pet-
roleum and motor vehicles followed by iron and steel, agri-
cultural machinery, pharmaceuticals", etc., while its ex-
ports " lean heavily to coffee, tea and petroleum pro-
ducts"3 (A Business International Report 1980: 27). To 
further rationalize this comparative advantage approach is 
the fact pointed out by the same research that Kenya's 
trade partners were mainly the industrialized countries. 
Thus, between them, Germany and the U.K. imported 49% of 
Kenya's exports while 51% of its imports came from European 
Economic Community (E.E.C.) countries. According to the 
1978 U.S. Embassy report in Nairobi, the major trade part-
ners ranked according to importance were U.K., Germany, 
Japan, Iran, U.S., France and Italy for imports while the 
U.K., Germany, Netherlands, U.S., Zambia and Japan for ex-
ports4 (see Appendix 2) [A Business International Report 
1980: 29]), i.e., mostly industrialized countries. 
In summary therefore, based on the 1937 and the recent 
1978 data, the evidence so far suggests that the compara-
tive advantage approach holds for East African overseas 
trade. 
Similar Factor Approach 
The reliability of the Comparative Advantage Approach 
is still far from perfection, however. One study that 
weighs heavily against this approach has indicated that 
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trade, on the contrary, occurs between countries with simi-
lar income and technology. Thus, because countries export 
goods that have already been successful in the local mar-
kets and because income determines the type of a commodity 
to consume, there will be trade within these countries. 
Implicitly therefore, there should be more trade within 
East Africa than it is with overseas partners. For exam-
ple, not only are most of the manufactured goods from Kenya 
sold into Uganda and Tanzania and vice versa, but also tea 
which is grown in each of the three countries has been 
found to be traded within the East African Community (EAC) 
probably based on transportation costs, product differenti-
ation or due to speculative motives. 
Based on the above analysis, another factor to think 
of is that even the industrial development that there is, 
is emphasized on the basis of import substitution rather 
than export oriented (except for exports within E.A.C.). 5 
(A Business International Report 1980: 53). For example, 
in Kenya the government has not only given a lot of protec-
tion to foreign investors against competition but also the 
output from these investments is sold within the E.A.c. 6 
(Swainson 1980: 232). The implication of these points is 
that even the kind of products produced by foreign firms in 
East Africa are only meant for trade within the E.A.C. 
(i.e., import substitution). Otherwise they would have 
-, 
found their way out to some place elsewhere or even not 
been manufactured in E. Africa in the first place. 
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a) Factor endowment evidence. To further amplify on 
this issue, note the fact that most of the subsistence 
economy is within the agricultural sector. We can there-
fore suggest that Kenya's high percentage in the monetary 
sector relative to Tanzania and Uganda can account for its 
being more industrialized. Thus in 1960, Kenya's monetary 
sector ranged from 77.7% of the economy to 78.7% in 1961 
compared to Tanzania's 65.1% to 64.8% and Uganda's 72.7% to 
71.2% in the same period7 (Leys 1974: 118). On the other 
hand, the G.D.P. estimates for 1960-63 show that Kenya's 
agriculture and fishing contributed only 22.0% of G.D.P. 
while manufacturing contributed 18.2% compared to Tan-
zania's 39.3% of agriculture and fishing with 14.7% manu-
facturing while Uganda had 49.8% agriculture and fishing 
with only 10.9% in manufacturing8 (Leys & Robson 1965: 
227). And the last indicator we want to use to show 
Kenya's endowment advantage in manufacturing is probably 
its high rate of capital formation, i.e., 37.9% compared to 
23.9% for Tanzania and 16.7% for Uganda 9 (Leys & Robson 
1965: 227). 
b) The corresponding trade pattern. Now that we 
have found Kenya's data to show a resource endowment in 
manufacturing over the rest of E. Africa, the comparative 
theory suggests that Kenya should export manufactured 
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products and import agricultural products within the com-
munity. The former (exporting manufactured goods) has held 
while the latter (importing agricultural goods) has not. 
According to the Annual Trade Report for Kenya, Uganda and 
Tanzania, the value of food imported in 1962 from Kenya to 
both Uganda and Tanzania netted 59% of the community's food 
output with 26% exported to Uganda while 33% to Tanzania. 
In return, Uganda's net of 28.3% was exported, 25.7% to 
Kenya and only 2.6% to Tanzania while Tanzania's net of 
12.9% was exported, 10.9%to Kenya and 2% to Uganda 10 
(Leys & Robson 1965: 228). As shown in Appendix 3, Kenya 
exported more of both products (agricultural and manufac-
tured) than it importea11 (Swainson 1980: 223-235)~ This 
trade pattern runs contrary to the suggestion that a 
country usually specializes in a commodity of which it has 
the least comparative disadvantage given the above endow-
ment evidence. 
Overseas Level 
The above studies on inter-territorial trade might be 
due to some interference into the market system. Govern-
ments, as we shall see, have often times intervened in mar-
ket resource allocation for political and social reasons. 
The other reason why Kenya has not specialized in manuf ac-
tur ing completely is economic, i.e., overseas trade. Thus, 
Kenya does not only have the least comparative disadvantage 
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in agriculture relative to its major overseas trade part-
ners (Britain and Germany) but in fact, all East African 
nations tend to trade more with other countries outside the 
community than within. 
For example, Kenya's import value from overseas was 
90.4% and only 9.6% from East Africa, Tanzania had 77.3% 
from overseas and 22.7% from East Africa while Uganda had 
77.4% from overseas compared to 22.6% from East Africa. 
The exports to overseas on the other hand accounted for 
72.1% from Kenya, 95.7% from Uganda and 83.9% from Tanzania 
compared to exports within the community of 27.9% from 
Kenya, 4.3% from Uganda and 16.1% from Tanzania12 (Leys & 
Robson 1965: 229). This picture of overseas/inter-terri-
torial trade pattern indicates that the comparative theory 
is not invalid so far. 
A Rejoiner in the Mercantalist Perspective 
The theory of comparative advantage was originally 
meant to correct the mercantalist view of trade whereby 
gains to one country represented losses to the other. How-
ever, based on the analysis and interpretations of the bal-
ance of payments, it is in my view that the mercantalist 
perspective still has some dominance. Thus, even if both 
countries gain from trade, the terms of trade and their ef-
fects have been given a stronger attention in the economic 
and political arena than absolute gains in themselves. In 
9 
this case, gains are seen as being absolute whereas terms 
of trade are relative. Given that countries usually deter-
mine their gains according to how much better they have 
performed in comparison to other countries (e.g., the high-
est GNP, highest per capita income, highest standards of 
living, etc.) rather than how they did on overall, the mer-
cantalist interpretation remains important. rt is with 
this view that we analyze the consequences of trade in East 
Africa. 
CONSEQUENCES OF TRADE 
The economics theory has shown and pedagogically 
proved that there are benefits from trade. Theories too, 
have pointed out the limits of these benefits. Implicit in 
these theories is the fact that assumptions behind every 
theory must hold. However, some assumptions and some neg-
lected factors might be so strong as to invalidate a the-
ory. Hence, the better measurement is the empirical evi-
dence. 
For example, one of the factors neglected by the com-
parative advantage approach is the feelings on the ration-
ality of distributing trade benefits. Whereas the E. Afri-
can inter-territorial trade has contributed to a sustained 
economy within the EAC in general, the comparative advant-
age policy in particular has led to the enriching of the 
Kenyan nation relative to its partners. Thus, as we have 
statistically seen, Kenya has been the major producer of 
both agricultural and industrial products. This is mainly 
because of the centripetal economic force in the form of 
Economies of Scale. The dictates of this force has been 
the establishment of an imperfect market in which the 
theory of comparative advantage has therefore failed to 
hold. Thus, the original comparative advantage has been 
modified into what I would call an "advanced absolute 
advantage" (i.e., where the price ratio of products ex-
change makes one country to have an absolute advantage in 
all commodities) and therefore reaching to a point where 
trade is exploitative (i.e., there are the same "N" units 
of benefits but all in favor of one partner). 
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These facts are reflected in the balance of trade 
within the E.A.C. countries as shown in Appendix 413 
(Zwanenberg 1975:- 244). According to this data, over a 
range of five years Kenya had a positive balance of pay-
ments all the way while both Uganda and Tanzania simul-
taneously showed negative balances. This is consistent 
with historical trends which show the "percentage of total 
value of East African interterritorial exports" as they 
correlate with the intensification of trade. Thus, noting 
the fact that after World War II, Britain incorporated 
Tanzania to form the Imperial British East African Company 
(IBEAC), and therefore the beginning of the Common Market, 
it is striking to notice that Kenya's percentage value from 
trade was 36.2% in 1945, Uganda had 41% and Tanzania had 
22.8%. In 1951, Kenya commanded 50.8% of the value, Uganda 
got 33.5% and Tanzania survived with 15.7%. By 1966, Kenya 
had the leading of 65.7% of the value while Uganda obtained 
23.7% and Tanzania made only 10.6%14 (Zwanenberg 1975: 
242). 
The implication of this data correlating with the 
formation of the Common Market is that the more open the 
12 
market became, the more one nation (Kenya) gained while 
others (Uganda and Tanzania) lQ~~. Consequently, Kenya has 
obtained the highest GDP and per capita income compared to 
its partners as the table below shows for the 1976 
study15 (Killick 1976: 57). 
Related to this is the data which shows "expansion of 
inter-territorial trade in East Africa between 1944 and 
1966 which is shown in Appendix 5 (Zwanenberg 1975: 
243). 16 As we have already noted that there is no ques-
tion about occurrence of benefits but a question about dis-
tribution. This data shows that all countries have been ex-
panding. However, Kenya expanded from K£1.09 millions in 
1944 to K 28.9 millions in 
The GDP and Per Capita Income - East Africa 
Country % of Total E.A. GDP Per Capital Income (Shs) 
Kenya 39 934 
Uganda 31 870 
Tanzania 30 637 
SOURCE: Tony Killick, University of Nairobi, "Past and 
Future Research on the East African Economies", 
Eastern Africa Economic Review, Vol. 8, #1, 
December 1976. 
1966 compared to Uganda which started at a high of K 1.98 
millions in 1944 to K 10.45 millions in 1966 while Tanzania 
grew from K .66 millions to K 4.65 millions in the same 
13 
period. The evidence so far doesn't deny the benefits pre-
dicted by the comparative theory but questions the useful-
ness of those benefits. If trade is beneficial, it should 
encourage both partners to trade rather than discourage 
them. In this case for East Africa, we have found that the 
closer together was the idea of a Common Market, the more 
discouraging were the results. 
Where is Kenya's Comparative Advantage? 
Given the fact that Kenya had advantages in both agri-
cultural and industrial goods, we will use Kenya to repre-
sent the trend of trade between East Africa and the rest of 
the world as well as trends within the community simultane-
ously. As already noted, trade with the rest of the world 
has mainly involved agricultural exports and industrial im-
ports. The major trading partner is Britain which is its 
former colonial power. For example, according to the data 
released in November of 1983 by the Kenya Tea Development 
Authority (KTDA), 50% of tea imported into Britain is from 
Kenya. And while Kenya commands 9.8% of the total world 
tea export, it ranks third to India and Srilanka for total 
world tea output 17 (Vernon 1981: 94). 
However, Kenya's main export is not tea but coffee, 
i.e., in 1970 coffee accounted for 31.1% of the total ex-
ports, tea was 17.7%, petroleum products 11.4%, meat 4%, 
pyrethrum 3%, sodium carbonate·2%, etc. In terms of GDP, 
14 
agriculture accounted for 14.26%, manufacturing and repair-
ing 10.98%, transport and retail 9.94%, etc. 18 on the 
other hand, the growth rate was 15.5% in construction, 
10.9% in banking and insurance compared to 7.7% in manu-
facturing and only 4.9% in agriculture (Leys 1974: 276-
278). 
The significance of this data is to show the import-
ance of Kenya's agriculture in trade with overseas countr-
ies and therefore implying that Kenya is more of an agri-
cultural than industrial country. In return, Kenya and 
other community members import industrial and machinery 
products from overseas. 
Indeed, Kenya imports more products from overseas than 
from the community, i.e., K£41.5 millions from the U.K., 
~£24.5 millions from western Europe and only K£15.9 mil-
lions from the EAC. On the contrary, Kenya exports more 
products to the EAC than overseas, i.e., K£31.4 millions to 
the EAC, K£14.8 millions to the U.K. and K£13.3 millions to 
western Europe (a phenomena that reveals some relative bar-
gaining powers). This fact indicates some elements of com-
parative advantage in that most of Kenya's imports are from 
industrialized countries on which it capitalizes by dominat-
ing the EAC markets. 
15 
Effects of Trade 
As we have previously seen, trade has affected factor 
allocation, distribution of benefits and general growth. 
In terms of resource allocation, Kenya has come out with a 
dual economy producing agricultural products for overseas 
trade while manufactured goods for the community. The lat-
ter has encouraged foreign investments in Kenya. For ex-
ample, even by 1965 when the community was still young, 
U.S. investments had already amounted to $90 millions in 
Kenya (Blood 1966: 84). 19 
In terms of distribution, it is said by many econo-
mists that commodity and factor exchange is beneficial to 
both partners. Paul Samuelson has focused on what he calls 
the "positive effect of a transfer on the terms of trade" 
and "the welfare effect of transfer on the donor and the 
recipient", 20 (Bhagwati 1983: 606) i.e., exchange is 
beneficial. This exchange not only applies to commodities 
but also to factors such as technical assistance, general 
labor, capital, etc. According to F.L.R. Batiz of the 
University of Chicago, immigration affects the price com-
petitiveness of industries it helps to expand 21 (Bartiz 
1983: 184). Thus, in the case of East Africa, the supply 
of technocratic labor helps to push down the prices of the 
commodities produced by that labor in order to be compet-
itive on world markets. 
16 
However, this distribution also has negative effects 
especially on balance of payments (to use our advanced mer-
cantalist thinking). As we saw earlier, Kenya had a sur-
plus while Tanzania and Uganda maintained deficits. From 
the previous statistics we have also noticed that Kenya im-
ported more from overseas than it exported. The consequ-
ence relationship that is established based on comparative 
advantage theory therefore becomes that of the weak and the 
strong thereby affecting the bargaining power and terms of 
trade. These terms are fixed by the relative bargaining 
power of the partners through price differentials in favor 
of the powerful ones. For example, in 1962, most of 
Kenya's exports overseas were priced below the prices of 
those goods exported to the community (see Appendix 6) 22 
(Leys & Robson 1965: 84). This is enhanced by the accumula-
tion of resources through demand and supply forces that 
favor Kenya. In Marxian terms, a capitalist drive to ex-
ploit which Lenin refers to as imperialism. According to 
Lenin, this exploitation is the result of the "monopoly 
stage of capitalism" as opposed to the "competitive stage 
of capitalism" in which there is no strong/weak relation-
ship. 23 
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CHAPTER II 
FOREIGN AID AND INVESTMENTS IN KENYAN INDUSTRIAL ECONOMY 
The previous chapter dealt with the whole Kenyan econ-
omy and where its strength lies. This chapter focuses 
mainly on the industrial economy of Kenya that is more re-
lated to the MNC operations. Whereas the previous chapter 
portrayed a strong economy in charge of its own destiny 
with few exceptions, this chapter takes a skeptical view in 
terms of economic implications of MNC operations in Kenya 
especially in social and political spheres. 
The chapter runs through topics such as why MNCs go 
abroad, LDS economic structures, who controls Kenya's econ-
omy, impact of MNCs and possible policies in such situa-
tions. It is with this background together with the pre-
vious chapter that a diversified picture of various ques-
tionable issues of significance will be brought to light. 
This background also shades the image of how complicated it 
can be to deal with most problems related to international 
economic oper~tions. The situation is even worse when 
evaluating the LDC-MDC relationships as they are linked by 
the MNCs. 
---------------- ------ --------------~ 
WHY MNCs GO ABROAD 
Empirical Studies 
The Multinational Corporations have been theoretically 
and empirically determined to go abroad based on a variety 
of reasons. On one hand, this may be induced from within 
the parent company such as the desire to make profits, mar-
ket share, diversity, use their competence among the econo-
mic reasons, while the other reasons could be political 
such as strategic or ideological, historical or geographi-
cal. On the other hand, the inducement may come from the 
host country which may desire to promote employment for 
purposes of obtaining revenues, technology, improving ex-
change reserves or politically such as to maintain its 
power. 
According to Eiteman and Stonehill (1982:4) based on 
the rate of return, the company will want to translate pro-
duct market imperfections into market opportunities. And 
only large firms (operating international), are better able 
to exploit such competitive facts as economies of scale, 
managerial and technological expertise, financial strength, 
etc. These large firms are also said to have an advantage 
of an organized internal information network that can help 
identify suitable areas of operation. Caves (1982:161), 
however has not been able to confirm this view which he 
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refers to as arbitrage of capital. Some studies show that 
in this case, the U.S. should have more foreign investments 
from abroad than its firms have abroad. 
Studies on Kenya emphasize othei factors more than the 
arbitrage motive. Indeed, as we shall see later, the his-
torical and geographic facts have been more influential. 
Historically, most of the multinational corporations are 
from Britain as Appendix 7 shows, i.e., 67% of the book 
value of foreign investments in Kenya were from Britain in 
1972. For example, 50% of banking business was owned by 
two British firms, 80% of mineral output, (Langdon 1981:31) 
and 23.5% of tea production (Leys 1974:118). This was due 
to the colonial ties after Kenya obtained its independence 
from Britain in 1963. Caves has shown that, according to 
Nankani (1979:Chapter 3), foreign investments are enlarged 
between LDCs and their former colonial powers not only due 
to political protection and lower transaction costs but 
also because their termination posed a threat to the in-
dustrial nation's remaining exports to her former colonies. 
His argument is based on the tariffs that the newly inde-
pendent countries would install (Caves 1982: 58). 
In the case of Kenya, this can also be evidenced by 
the previous large firms that had been established before 
independence. These firms helped to attract new firms 
especially when they were not politically affected after 
independence. This assurance of political stability has 
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been theorized by Nehrt (1970} in his book as the Model of 
Political Climate for private investments. In his theory, 
three variables identified are the policy statements of 
political leaders and the government such as assuring for-
eign firms operations, actions of the government such as 
nationalization, appropriations or passing investment 
codes, selling, public companies to private firms, etc., 
and lastly the historical context based on its previous 
actions and stability. Other theories such as the H-W-M 
political system stability index (Eiteman 1982:306} use the 
quantitative method, to determine the propensity of a 
country to expropriate foreign firms. 
On the geographical basis, some of the multinational 
firms have located in Kenya just because they would have 
access to the Mombasa harbor or because of the hydroelect-
ric power generated by the Nile. As for the Kenyan Multi-
national Corporations, their location has been based on the 
distances involved with the countries in which they oper-
ate. For example, the Kenya National Trading Company 
(KENATCO} operations in Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, Congo, 
Ruanda and Malawi is based on the geographical closeness 
that enables direct road communication links. 
Theoretical Studies 
The major categories that have been classified by caves 
(1982:Chapter 1) are those of horizontal, vertical and 
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diversified types of MNCs. In using this theory, Caves 
enumerated a variety of reasons why the multinational firms 
are in existence in the first place. However, common in all 
of them is the element of transactional costs. These are 
said to determine a firm's entry into the market or not. 
Thus, if a firm has an intangible asset that is firm spec-
ific such as a proprietary process, the information system, 
managerial skills, etc., it would prefer to make Direct 
Foreign Investment (DFI) than try to market that intangible 
asset at arms length transaction. 
several problems are encountered in this particular 
firm's approach to FDI because this involves transfer pric-
ing on factors that are not easy to determine the price. 
The host country will find it difficult to compare prices 
since there is no any other point of reference while the MNC 
will find problems of justifying the price it is charging. 
THE HISTORICAL STRUCTURE OF LDC'S ECONOMIES 
The Third World countries are mainly characterized by 
their young economic structures. The structures are strat-
ified in a way that there is very little surplus to be re-
invested to generate economic growth. We can compare this 
situation with Rostow's explanation of the "Precondition to 
Take Off Stage". Thus, what is most needed is to break 
through what Gunner Myrdal has called the Cumulative Causa-
tion popularly known by economists as the vicious circle of 
poverty. 
In Kenya, this situation is evidenced by the fast 
growing population that consumes any extra surplus from 
production. 1 Consequently, if Kenya had to break through 
its vicious circle, it needed an outside emancipating 
force. This force has inevitably been the Multinational 
Corporation (MNC). With its negative and positive effects, 
the MNC has played a significant role in Kenya's socio-eco-
nomic structure that needs a very close examination. To 
examine it we divide these effects into those of wholly 
owned operations or joint ventures and those in which the 
MNCs are not involved in or have let their hands off. 
WHO CONTROLS INDUSTRY IN KENYA? 
Kenya has a large portion of its economy run by the 
MNCs. Thus by 1972, the MNCs investments in Kenya were 
valued at K 130 millions, i.e., over 20%of the country's 
Gross National Product (GNP) with a net private long term 
capital inflows of over K£77 million in the period 1967-
1972 which makes an average of 10% yearly total capital 
formation (Langdon, 1981:31). Indeed, in 1972, 50% of the 
banking business was owned by two British banks, and 80% of 
the mineral output was handled by the British owned Imper-
ial Chemical Industries. One survey also indicates that 
32% of wholesale and retail trade employment was accounted 
to only nine MNC subsidiaries which in fact make up only 
half of the foreign firms active in this sector (Langdon, 
1981:31). 
In agriculture as well, the MNC's have a large stake, 
i.e., the British owned Broke Bond Liebig alone produced 
23.5% of Kenya's tea in 1972. 2 In commerce and industry, 
some studies have even shown that between 1964 and 1970, 
50% increase of output and 100% increase in the annual 
level of investments was foreign owned and controlled (Leys 
1975: 118). In all, Kenya's economy between 1965 and 1972 
was largely foreign controlled, i.e., equity capital held 
by companies in Kenya amounted to 64% foreign owned, 2% 
- -- --------, 
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owned by other East African countries and only 35% owned by 
Kenyan companies (Swainson, 1980:239). 
This large foreign controlled sector was a result of 
historical trends, i.e., after Independence, the British 
large agriculture estate firms changed into manufacturing 
such as did Mitchell Cotts and Mackenzie Dalgety while 
others like Lonrho, British American Tobacco (BAT) and 
Brooke Bond Liebig expanded through acquisition (Swainson, 
1980:215). As Appendix 7 shows, the dominant MNCs were 
from the U.K., U.S., Germany, France and Japan in that 
order of ranking. 3 According to an East African Invest-
ment survey, the equity of foreign firms in Kenya consisted 
of 71% dominated in the sterling while only 29% in the non-
sterling in 1968 (Swainson, 1980:216) 
This empirical evidence implicates the role of MNCs in 
Kenya's economic decisions to be so vital and significant. 
One of the areas that is affected by these economic deci-
sions involve what to produce. The rationale could be 
based on profit maximization, national development or in-
ternational resource optimization. Given that profit max-
imization carries with it a negative connotation while most 
nationals doubt the faith of MNCs in national development, 
the dominant rationale has therefore been that of resource 
allocation. This rationale can be explained by the choice 
process of what to produce in any given economy. 
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The Choice of What to Produce 
One of the basic problems in less developed countries' 
(LDCs) economic development is the choice of what to pro-
duce. Given that other things remain constant, the econ-
omic rationale postulates that a country should specialize 
in the production of the commodity it has the least compara-
tive disadvantage. Hence, the question of what to produce 
doesn't become a problem. In the case of Kenya, it should 
therefore produce coffee and tea because these products 
happen to flourish so well in Kenya. First, this is be-
cause of the prevailing climatic conditions which are suit-
able for the crops. Secondly, these products need plenty 
of unskilled labor which is apparently available in Kenya 
as the data below shows from the 1962 census. 
Availabiliti of Skilled Labor 
Non-formal With Primary With Secondary 
Education Education Education 
Males over 
15 years 68% 31% 1% 
Males 25-29 years 51% 46% 3% 
Source: Morris and somerset, The African Entrepreneur, p. 
211. 
However, the decision to produce coffee or tea will 
need further qualifications as we can empirically and theo-
retically find out. Empirically, Kenya decided to produce 
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more tea and coffee as early as the coming of the British 
Colonial power. As the British Information Services re-
ports, the largest farms of over 2000 acres were "estates 
growing crops such as tea, wattle or sisal" and that almost 
90% of the exports from Kenya were agricultural and also· 
that "the chief export crops, i.e., tea, coffee, sisal and 
wattle are grown mainly on plantations by European 
planters." 4 
For example, current data shows that Kenya now ranks 
third to India and Srilanka for total world tea output 
(Weekly Review, Nov. 11, 1983:26). However, Kenya's main 
export is in fact not tea but coffee. Thus, in 1950, cof-
fee accounted for 21% of exports, in 1960 about 29% and in 
1970, 31% (Leys, 1975:276). 
From this empirical evidence, we can safely say that 
Kenya has positively responded to the comparative approach 
solution as to what to produce. However, the consequences 
so far imply that this was a degenerating solution. Since 
agricultural production demands more unskilled labor, it is 
most likely that it will perpetuate illiteracy which is a 
menace to development. 
Agricultural products have also been found to be un-
stable and therefore adversely affecting the balance of 
payments. Thus, they are vulnerable to natural calamities, 
they have low income elasticities, i.e., between 0.3 to 0.5 
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(Todaro, 1977:371), very competitive and easily replaced by 
synthetics. 
In the face of such agricultural odds, the LDS's have 
therefore opted for rapid industrialization as evidenced by 
the Import Substitution and Industrialization (ISI) policy 
in Latin America (Todaro, 1983 by Werner Baer, p. 27). 
Given their poor economic position, it is not surprising 
that their only remedy was to be found in the MNCs. And now 
that the MNCs dominated this industrial sector and even 
some large scale agriculture, the LDS economic planners had 
virtually no powers to direct their economies in their own 
interest. Hence there grew the need for natives to parti-
cipate in the economic machinery. Due to high initial 
costs, it is not surprising that the most welcome option 
was that of a joint venture. In spite of the ill effects 
that this option promoted, it can equally be argued that 
the trend and especially in decision making has been im-
pressive. 
The Joint Venture System 
The Joint Venture System in Kenya has been increasing 
at a significant rate. However, the spread has not been 
diversified in that only a few lucky individuals have been 
able to buy stocks. The major shareholder in joint ven-
tures however has been the government itself. Therefore, 
foreign equity will still need more time to be matched by 
private indigenous ownership. 
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Initially, foreign equity had been declining slowly as 
a percentage until 1970 when it started to pick up momen-
tum. According to Herman, on average the citizen's equity 
in joint ventures amounted to slightly over 9% of the new 
foreign investments between the years 1964-1970. As we 
will soon see, most of the changes during these years were 
political and therefore legislative rather than operational 
(Leys, 1975:119). 
On the other hand, since the 1970s, the economic 
structure in Kenya has changed rapidly from wholly owned 
MNCs to Joint venture basis whereby the government, private 
citizens and organizations have bought substantial shares 
of the MNCs. This trend actually, as we have noted above, 
started as early as under the auspices of the 1964 Foreign 
Investment Protection Act whereby subsidiaries were re-
quired to obtain a Certificate of Approved Enterprise for 
new operations in Kenya. This was followed by the Immigra-
tion Act of 1967 that encouraged Kenyanization of most oper-
ations especially with the creation of the Industrial and 
Commercial Development Corporation. Thus, after independ-
ence it was felt that the economy was dominated by non-Ken-
yans whose decisions might not be in the interest of Kenyan 
development. To do so, these statutes encouraged Kenyans 
to have shares to influence major economic decisions by 
affected enterprises. But, the mortar of drastic changes 
was reserved for the 1970s (Langdon, 1981 
3 6) • 
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As the table below shows, the trend has been increas-
















These drastic changes in the 1970s were significant in 
the strategic industries and most of them were shares 
bought by government. For example, between 1968 and 1972, 
the Building Construction and Electricity sector was re-
duced from 58% to 19% foreign ownership when the government 
bought 100% share capital and management of the East 
-----i 
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African Power and Lighting from a British MNC. In mining 
and quarrying, foreign equity was reduced from 88% in 1968 
to 67% in 1972 after the purchase of the East African Oil 
Refineries at Mombasa (Swainson, 1980:217-219). As can be 
seen from Appendix 10, the foreign equity in the manufac-
turing sector fell from 71% to 63% while Building and con-
struction (without electricity) fell from 87% to 75% and 
mining and quarrying from 93% to 81%. 
This same trend of Kenyanization is revealed in Appen-
dix 11 which shows the number of private companies forming 
in Kenya in 1955 as 70% by Europeans, 28% Asians, 9% Afri-
can and 6% mixed. Ten years later (1965), the number con-
sisted of 28% Europeans, 34% Asian, 25% African and 12% 
mixed. By 1973, the combination was 15% European, 25% 
Asian, 46% African and 15% mixed. 
Another indicator reflecting African expansion into 
the system is in business partnerships which consisted of 
11% African in 1954, ten years later was 54% African and by 
1973 constituted 80%. According to swainson's sample of 
private firms registering in Kenya in 1965, Africans domin-
ated the low income firms while in 1973, they had moved to 
the middle level and even some were in the 100,000 size 

























Thus in 1965 94% of the Africans' New Company registra-
tion was in low size Gross Product while in 1973 the major-
ity were in the medium size Gross Product. 
Such was the massive infiltration into the economy 
that the 1970s can be seen as being very significant in 
Kenya's economic development. However, the MNC still holds 
enormous power in the Kenyan economic decisions with mixed 
consequences for the nation's development. 
THE IMPACT OF MNCs IN KENYA 
The impact which the Multinational Corporations have 
caused on the Kenyan social, political, economic and inter-
national relations are very significant. Since most of 
these effects are two-sided with negative and positive ef-
fects we shall examine their pros and cons simultaneously. 
In the preceding sections we shall encounter the term 
appropriateness. In our case, the term would refer to a 
technology, expertise, enterprise or influence that is com-
patible to the economic plan which also states economic pol-
icies. Where the planning policy has been said to be inap-
propriate, such as the education system, I have given a 
particular criteria of what is appropriate depending on the 
individual situation. 
General Effects 
One effect that the MNCs have brought about is the 
conspicuous pattern of consumption. This can be partially 
explained by the trade balance in Appendix 2. According to 
this data, Kenya's imports from its top seven trading part-
ners between 1976 and 1978 had a percentage increase of 
more than 25% while its exports to the six top partners de-
creased by more than 10% in the same period. For example, 
imports from Britain increased by 138.8% while its exports 
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to the Netherlands (the sixth of the top importers) de-
clined by 49.2%. 
Another supporting explanation can be gathered from 
the following data. 
IMPORT PATTERN MILLIONS OF SHILLINGS 
Consumer goods, 


























15211. l 2533. 0 
2060.1 2821.5 
Thus, before 1978, Consumer goods competed effectively 
with other imports. In fact, in 1974 consumer goods ranked 
third out of the five large categories of imports, i.e., 
40% of imports consisted of Industrial Supplies, 21% Fuels 
and Lubricants, 16% Consumer Goods, 12% Transport Equipment 
and 11% Machinery and other Capital Equipment. 
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On the other hand, the Multinationals provided a range 
of new products that helped to promote Kenya's economy such 
as nutritious foods, medicine, hygiene products, other use-
ful domestic products, etc. Without proof, here we can at-
tribute to some of the cause for the fast growing popula-
tion in Kenya to be good nutrition, health care and medi-
cine that have decelerated the death rate. 
Also, due to their high economies of scale and effi-
cient technology, the MNCs have encouraged production effi-
ciency in Kenya through effective competition or have help-
ed to check skyrocketing prices. For example, in some com-
modities, Kenya had been found to sell at high prices with-
in East Africa while very cheaply abroad as the table in 
Appendix 6 shows. The implication is that the market of 
these products in East Africa had been monopolized by Kenya 
such that the prices are above world competitive prices. 
The MNC competitive nature could therefore help to equate 
the prices. 
Demographic Effects 
Another impact has been on rural urban migration es-
pecially Nairobi whose population has grown at an unpre-
cedented alarming rate. A study by Langdon has shown that 
most of the MNCs located their operations in big cities es-
pecially Nairobi (Langdon, 1980:93). Ogendo's data is in 
line with this study in that 52.6% of industrial operatives 
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were located in the two major cities of Nairobi (34.1%) and 
Mombasa (18.5% [Ogendo 1972: 54]). 
Worse than this has been a disproportionate distribu-
tion of economic amenities in favor of Nairobi Province 
(see Appendix 12). Thus, in 1974, Nairobi Province re-
corded wage employment of 79.9% of the total labor force, 
recorded twice the earnings per wage worker than the second 
largest city, had 47.6% of total hospital beds and absorbed 
80.3% of government expenditures per capita. As a result, 
40% of the industrial workers are employed in these same 
two cities, i.e., 28.9% in Nairobi and 11.1% in Mombasa 
(Ogendo, 1972:54). Given this pattern of industrial loca-
tions, the consequences have been more labor migrations 
than equivalent jobs created which is a similar situation 
to the Todaro rural/urban migration model. This postulates 
that for every new job created in the cities, more than one 
immigrant move into the city (Todaro, 1981:239-246). 
Education System Effects 
Another problem facing LDCs in the era of MNCs has 
been the education system. Kenya's education system goes 
back to the British Colonial School System whose aim was to 
educate the Kenyan Africans to appreciate and struggle to 
achieve the British way of life. After Independence, the 
same system continued but with a slight variation emphasiz-
ing the training of Kenyans irito the vacant administrative 
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positions. In the 1970s, both systems prevailed but yet 
with another addition. More administrative technocrats 
produced than positions trained for are available. This 
was a blueprint of the MNCs recipe, i.e., the training of 
the entrepreneur, the accountant, the salesperson, the 
systems analyst, the independent consultant and a huge army 
of secretaries who all set the important trends of the 
economy. These business technocrats have further encour-
aged education by sponsoring aspiring business people 
mostly based on the level of education as the table below 
shows. 
Education of Businessmen and the General Population 1962 
% of Years of Formal Education 
None Primarz Secondary 
Males over 15 years 68% 31% 1% 
Males 25-29 years 51% 46% 3% 
Mkt businessmen 23% 73% 4% 
ICDC Supported Businessmen 7% 68% 25% 
Source: Harris and Somerset, p. 211. 
Thus, the percentage of males between ages 15 and 24 with-
out formal education is 68% and only 1% with secondary edu-
cation while those of ages 25-29 were 51% and 3% respec-
tively. Compare these percentages with businessmen sup-
ported by the Industrial Commercial and Development Corpor-
ation (ICDC) of 7% without education and 25% with secondary 
education. Moreover, a correlational effect of education 
and business can be made when one compares the 23% market 
businessmen without education with 73% with at least some 
primary education. 
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Another role that education has played in business is 
that the size of business has been related to the level of 
education. A study done by Morris and Somerset indicates 
that 40% of the businesses were owned by businessmen with 
less than four years of formal education, and without an 
employee while only 25% had more than six employees. On 
the other hand, those of more than nine years of education 
consisted of only 4% without an employee and 13% with more 
than six employees. The ICDC supported businessmen with 
less than four years education consisted of only 8% with 
over 11 employees while 30% for those with secondary educa-
tion. 
The consequences have been very reflective of what the 
business community expected. Only 21% of businessmen with 
less than four years of education had profits above sh 300 
compared to 43% of businessmen with secondary education 
(Morris and Somerset, 1971:212-213). 
Dualistic System Effects 
Against these leaps is the reality of the economy. As 
we have seen, only those privileged with access to formal 
education have been successful in the business world just 
as the few who got administrative positions succeeded in 
the previous educational system. The vast majority are 
doomed including even some with formal education. And 
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among those with access to education, only those previously 
employed in skilled manual jobs were successful (see Appen-
dix 13). The implications of such a system which renders 
its victims knowledge which they will never use is very 
discouraging. All the three systems have focused on exog-
enous rather than indigenous symbiosis of all factors that 
will promote development. Thus, whereas the successful few 
have been able to be integrated into the international busi-
ness system, the vanquished majority have been subordinated 
to an internal structure that is expensive and hard to 
break through. The dualistic nature can be likened to 
Amin's classification of the center and the periphery, 
i.e., the few advantaged make up the local center that at-
tracts the flow of wealth from the peripheral while through 
their international links, they act as the medium of re-
source transfer from LDCs. Hence there is a need for a 
structure that can avoid this kind of vagaries of the MNC's 
era. 
Planning Distortions 
Coupled with these bleak chances of success based on 
education, the consequential unemployment has been the con-
stant feature of technology. And indeed, the most 
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significant impact of the MNCs has been their sophisticated 
technology too exotic for appropriate utilization. Often 
times it has led to disastrous results due to lack of com-
prehensive feasibility analysis. For example, in one dis-
trict, it was hoped that introduction of hybrid dairy cows 
would not only provide milk for families but would also aug-
ment the supplies to the Kenya creameries Corporation 
(KCC). The Corporation loaned the progressive farmers 
funds to purchase the new breeds. However, since some farm-
ers were skeptical of the new breed, they not only contin-
ued to keep their native cows but also refused to fund the 
cattle dip to be constructed for prevention of the East 
Coast fever from ticks. And since they couldn't use the 
dip and their cows were immune, the disease was never com-
batted and within two years there was no surviving landmark 
of a hybrid cattle except for the huge debts on the backs 
of progressive farmers. 
Another case involved consolidation of land for econo-
mic large scale farming. on the slopes of Mt. Elgon small 
patches of land separated by tufts of grass were sold to 
large scale progressive farmers who used tractors. Their 
farming became so massive but without erosion checks that 
rain and wind took off the fertile top soils. This re-
sulted in very low output per unit of land than before. 
Worse, some technologies have been imported as a sal-
vaging process when found obsolete in the originating 
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country. In such cases, not only have Kenyan industrial-
ists been forced to remain behind their counterparts in 
developed countries but they have also been locked into a 
technology whose spare parts are hard or economically ex-
pensive to find. And not to mention the pollution effect 
(e.g., the Indian Pan Paper Mills that has polluted and 
killed all wildlife along the third largest river in Kenya 
and now threatens its mouth - Lake Victoria, the second 
largest lake in the world). 
And lastly, because of their emphasis on mechaniza-
tion, part of the unemployment problem in Kenya can be at-
tributed to these technologies. According to Ogendo's 
study, mechanization has often increased with the size of 
the firm and that most of the employment was provided by 
non-mechanized operatives, i.e., 58.1% (Ogendo, 1972:78). 
And according to the Industrial Census of 1971, the highest 
numbers employed were in rolling stock, textiles, and sawn 
timber while major industrial branches in Kenya are capital 
intensive and use relatively smaller amounts of labor com-
pared to their output. 
creation of the Elite Corrupt Bourgeoisie 
Along with this structural unemployment is the effect 
on income distribution. The MNC's mechanized efficient 
production makes it possible for them to pay higher wages 
than Kenyan average wages. However, the main problem here 
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is not based on productivity but on company wage scales. 
Given that a counterpart manager in the U.S. or U.K. is 
earning a lucrative wage, the Kenyan manager will also de-
mand the same rights from the company. Comparatively, the 
Kenyan MNC manager will therefore earn more than a fellow 
Kenyan managing a local equivalent operation. Not only 
does this disproportionate income distribution enhance the 
gap between the elite technocrats and therefore discourage 
local initiative but also it influences political decision 
making, corruption and poor resource allocation. 
In terms of political distortion of the economy, Swain-
son found out that cement distribution by MNCs was forced 
to go through five Nairobi firms one owned by a powerful 
member of Parliament who not only was ~he Director of 
Lonrho (the largest MNC in Kenya) but is also a brother to 
the Chairman of Kenya National Transport Corporation (the 
largest transportation company in Kenya) and a son-in-law 
to the nation's president (Swainson, 1980:187). These 
bourgeoisie class also has been found to have a strong al-
liance with MNCs as it surfaced in 1973 boardroom crisis. 
During a struggle for leadership within the parent Lonrho 
Company at its headquarters in London, Mr. Rowland who had 
been accused of poor investments was saved by the Kenyan 
branch director from the threat of dropping him. Rowland's 
survival angered the British Prime Minister, Mr. Heath who 
called for the break up of the company (Swainson 1980:280). 
44 
This disproportional distribution is further evidenced 
by the relationship between the Kenyan directors of MNCs 
and their shares of investments. In one study, two of the 
top ten directors (the fifth and ninth) owned the largest 
shares of the firms in which they were directors (33 and 20 
respectively). On a profile of directors (the fourth and 
fifth), it has been found, for example, that the fourth 
director directed 36 firms holding a direct interest in 33 
firms. His ties includect the East African Breweries, saw 
mills, tea processing, a shoe factory, drugs and bricks 
manufacturing, a transport company, a line of Agip hotels, 
agriculture, etc. He is also a member of Parliament and an 
Assistant Minister for Energy and Regional Development 
(Swainson and Weekly Review). The fifth director sits on 
36 boards of foreign firms and 33 of which he owned parti-
ally or wholly including the biggest tourist hotel - New 
Stanley Hotel, Lyons Ice Cream, managing all the invest-
ments of 20th Century Fox, etc. According to the latest 
government reports into investigations of a former attor-
ney-general, his influence includes Kenya airways, port 
authorities, newspapers, and nearly all foreign firms with 
undetermined number of directorships. 
Indeed, the gap is so wide that new MNCs still find it 
to their advantage to associate themselves with such person-
alities as well as having commercial links with establish-
ments they control. An estimation using the Lorenz curve 
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in 1962 shows that the top 1% of Kenyan population accounts 
for 18.5% share of the total income, the top 5% earn 44.3% 
while the bottom 5% earn a mere 12%. The Calculated Gini 
Coefficient was found to be 0.60 (Killick, E. African Econ-
omic Review, vol. 8, #2:8). 
MNCs POSITIVE CONTRIBUTIONS 
very few studies have been done in Kenya to show the 
positive contributions of MNCs compared to the negative 
impact. Indeed, those studies that show the positive ef-
fects are based on the same facts flipped on the other 
side. Thus, starting with the general effects analyzed 
above, these studies show that conspicuous consumption is a 
sign of progress. In Gunner Myrdal's growth model, the 
highest stage of the development path is the high mass con-
sumption. Hence, imports are said to indicate availability 
of variety. 
On the demographic distribution, it could be argued 
that population concentration in urban areas is only a nat-
ural process of demand and supply forces to reallocate f ac-
tors of production. Given that there is higher demand for 
wage labor in cities than in the rural areas, it's natural 
that labor will move into cities. According to Oucho and 
Makras {1984), their study reverses the negative connota-
tion of rural urban migration. Through case studies, they 
conclude that both the urban and rural sectors have been in 
s~pportive of each other and that this migration especially 
into Nairobi has been of economic significance in the trans-
fers or distribution of wealth to the rural areas. 
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Other effects such as education have been said to pro-
mote not only managerial and administrative skills but also 
promoted the ability to detect and control MNC's unfair 
practices. The dualistic problem of the elite against the 
common people could also be analyzed on the basis of rural 
urban migration studies by indicating that the elite have 
something to offer to society too. And finally, with the 
exception of the few problems discovered in planning, the 
Kenyan plans have in most cases met their targets. 
THE ROLE OF MNCs IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
It is with this background that one can appropriately 
analyze the role of MNCs in Third World countries. Todaro 
has made some general observations about their contribu-
tions both negative and positive that fit the pattern we 
have just learned. One of the arguments he poses is that 
these foreign investments contribute by "filling in gaps 
between domestically available supplies of savings, foreign 
exchange, government revenue and skills, and the planned 
level of these resources necessary to achieve development 
targets." 
The counter arguments challenge the above notion of 
gap filling in that foreign investors stifle competition, 
repatriate profits, charge high interest rates, diminish 
government revenue through liberal tax concessions, allow-
ances and protection given to them. Todaro's study also 
found the problem of dualistic economic structures of in-
equality, introduction of inappropriate commodities, con-
sumption patterns, technologies and monopolistic power, ex-
traction of economic and political concession with reduced 
social returns. 
Given such a situation where MNC's contributions to 
the economy have been impressive but with a big question 
mark on development, it is necessary that developing 
countries examine the nature of their economies, the 
structures of foreign investments and the needs of their 
welfare before assessing and validating their strategic 
development approaches. Here, I will observe some of the 
variables significant to the analysis and formation of 
coherent national economic policies. 
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POLICY REMARKS 
Policies aimed at correcting LDC's economic imbalances 
and problems will need to emphasis the role of government 
and the MNCs in the economy. It is hoped here that the 
direction of these two major variables are very significant 
with the observation that a symbiotic relationship need to 
be established between these two variables. In any case, 
however, the government should take the leading role and 
its objectives should prevail if there is conflict of in-
terest. 
Among the important variables to be considered are 
those based on the economic viewpoint. According to Pear-
son (1969:169) the good industrial policy in East Africa 
should be where the government control extends widely and 
more deeply than would be acceptable in a capitalist sys-
tem, yet, less direct government involvement in productive 
activities than would be appropriate in a socialist soci-
ety. Thus, this mixture of state intervention alongside 
private enterprise is what he calls "African socialism": or 
"emergent capitalism". Pearson's three test criteria is to 
accept a project if it satisfies these questions: 
"i) Will in increase national income? 
ii) Will it earn or save foreign exchange? 
iii) Will it contribute to government revenue?" 
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In sum, a government's policy should therefore focus on its 
responsibility of optimizing the available means to improve 
the welfare of its people. A social cost benefit analysis 
has to be evaluated before any policy is made and the 
longer the time period it can be forecast, the more reli-
able it can be. 
To do this, the government should recognize that MNCs 
are very sophisticated enterprises especially those that 
are offshore. Other unique features to be carefully con-
sidered should include the proportion of intangible assets, 
the size of the corporation in terms of volume as well as 
geographical operation, its market of operation, i.e., 
whether more oligopolistic or more competitive by using the 
concentration ratio formula where if the four largest firms 
have equal or more than 50% of the market they are oligo-
polies. 
on the other hand, the government should recognize 
that some firms will have positive effects on the economy 
in the long run and should therefore be encouraged through 
various means as will be pointed out later. 
The Role of Government 
The major significant factor is an effective and com-
prehensive plan. Thus the plan should be feasible, inte-
grative and acceptable to the people of Kenya and in the 
interest of Kenyans. The main emphasis however should be 
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to focus the participants towards the direction of the eco-
nomy through inducements rather than dictating to them what 
to do, i.e., decentralized free market decision making. 
Among the inducements to be provided are low interest loans 
to acceptable sectors. This kind of inducement has been 
successful in Japan where the ruling party, which practic-
ally controls the major banks has been promoting indus-
trialization. The same has been the case with the French 
Planning System which involves penalties and inducements. 
Given the fact that agricultural products fetch low 
income on world markets and yet modern industrialization 
has encouraged sophisticated labor saving technologies (as 
we have seen before) as well as income disparities, the 
plan should emphasis moderate intermediate technologies, 
such as product recycling, food processing, saw milling and 
other import substituting production. The advantage here 
is that some balance of payments problems will be avoided, 
agricultural surpluses will be reduced and because of their 
moderate capital and high labor intakes, the economy will 
avoid being locked into simple agricultural tools yet still 
offering employment to the majority. The fundamental is-
sue, here, as Pearson has suggested, is that any project to 
be implemented should be based on whether it will (1) in-
crease national income; (2) earn or save foreign exchange; 
and (3) contribute to government revenue (Pearson, 1969: 
170). 
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Along with this should be an education system that em-
phasizes technical training such as building and construc-
tion, improved agricultural techniques, carpentry, gold-
smithing, business and other activities that train students 
for self employment rather than depending on MNC job open-
ings. To encourage these young technocrats into the econ-
omy, the government should encourage co-operatives through 
inducements such as cheaper licensing, loans, extension 
services and major infrastructures. co-operatives can be 
on an industry basis such as the dairy industry in Holland 
or on community basis such as the Chinese commune system. 
However, the government's decentralized planning system to 
the district level should be responsible for coordinating 
community co-operatives towards national planning goals. 
These co-operatives should be subject to anti-trust 
laws so that local competition is very much encouraged. 
This can follow the American model of breaking up big mono-
polistic companies. And at the same time, the Japanese 
policy of protecting large industries from outside competi-
tion but allowing fierce internal competition would be 
healthy. This can be done by subsidizing local research, 
awarding and protecting patent owners as well as encourag-
ing local purchases of government and other organizatioris' 
supplies (i.e., the famous 'Buy Kenya to own Kenya' slo-
gan). 
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Similarly important is to have experts make important 
decisions rather than politicians to avoid the "bits and 
pieces" type of projects and corruption. 
Another area of focus should be resource distribu-
tions. A progressive tax on income and property (with Rea-
ganomic type tax breaks where property is developmental) 
should be preferred against sales tax (except on imported 
luxury goods). The government subsidized loans should be 
selective to benefit the vast majority of potential pro-
ducers especially in the rural areas which is better done 
on district than national level. Trade and agricultural 
shows should be emphasized to help educate prospective pro-
ducers as well as making consumers aware of the products 
available. This will enable city dwellers to travel around 
their country and get to know their responsibilities as 
well as diverting their expenditures into the economy. 
More important is the imposition of high penalties for 
misuse of resources through tax refunds based on the income 
received from the property, e.g., a 10% tax on land but 
with a percentage refund on income earned from the use of 
land and where chronic, a fine should be imposed when pro-
perty is left unproductive. 
Internationally, the government should have an open 
trade in the sense that there is no discrimination to part-
icular partners in a given category such as within MDCs. 
The cheapest bidders and the highest offers should be 
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considered. However this policy should consider the stan-
dardization of products to avoid being tied to one partner 
for spare parts. 
Secondly, the government policy should be pro the 
formation of custom unions, trade areas, common markets, 
and geared toward international and multilateral corpora-
tions, as well joining the commodity and cartel agreements 
than tying itself on individual partners. The exports sec-
tor should emphasize its focus on LDC consumers whose de-
mand does not require sophisticated modes of production. 
The Role of MNCS 
The MNCs should be encouraged to make their invest-
ments especially in areas where local nationals are unable 
to invest and probably on turnkey type agreements such that 
after a given period of time, the operation should transfer 
to the local nationals. 
The MNCs should observe the laws as well as ethical 
conducts such as avoiding political scandals and illegal 
repatriation of currency in excess of that established in 
their contract. The MNCs should also encourage fair com-
petition in promotion of local efficiency without resort to 
predatory dumping and should use local resources as much as 
possible. 
Both the foreign and local companies should develop a 
symbiotic relation in league with the government. The 
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government should provide MNCs with available relevant in-
formation especially as regards the direction of the plan, 
and possibly be worked on the district level with the idea 
of product and geographical diversification. The MNC tech-
nologies should be compatible with the plan's requirements 
and provide the necessary link to the MDC sources and mar-
kets. 
Rejoinder 
In summary, the national policies should be comprehen-
sive, decentralized, diversified and feasible. They should 
be for the good of the nation but with an acceptable inter-
national image. 
CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Given the current status of the MNC in the world econ-
omy and more specifically to the Kenyan economy, we would 
conclude that a national policy to deal with MNCs should 
focus on the variables such as the theoretical and empiri-
cal evidences of why MNCs exist in the first place. This 
should be done with reference to the historical and current 
economic trends within the country with the aim of deducing 
the possible impact of the MNCs on national policy making. 
In this chapter, we observed that Kenya's vital econ-
omic decisions have almost all been made by non-nationals. 
First were the British colonists and then the multinational 
firms. In both the cases, we found out that the rationales 
for most of the decisions were either based on the notion 
of comparative advantage or profit maximization. The ef-
fects caused by these decisions were examined, with the use 
of data and general observations. From these studies, sug-
gestive policies were made with specific emphasis on the 
role of the government in directing economic decisions and 
the MNC's symbiotic relationship. Gathering from these, we 
can conclude that Third world countries' economic develoo-
~ 
ment and policies should not emanate from without but in-
deed, the fuel, the engine and the steering wheel should 
come from within, focused on the interest of the majority 
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SECTION TWO 
SPECIFIC ISSUES 
In Section one, the general economy was examined. 
Chapter I dealt with theoretical issues that map Kenya in 
the world economy. Chapter II bisected out the industrial 
economy that is related to the MNCs. In this section, we 
deal with specific issues that concern MNCs' effects on 
Kenyan.economic development and policy making. These are 
our leading issues as the title of this section suggests. 
Initially, a variety of issues will be tabled in gen-
eral terms with LDCs' complaints about MNCs stipulated 
first and then followed by interview responses from MNC 
executives in LDCs. In order to examine these issues from 
all angles, each particular issue will be first applied on 
the general economy. Then next particular economic vari-
ables such as labor in Chapter III, rural areas in Chapter 
IV and ideological issues in Chapter v will be examined in 
terms of all these issues in general. 
We have briefly noted some positive contributions of 
MNCs in Kenya with a lot of negative effects. But as I 
have already noted earlier, this thesis is to explore some 
of the notable and acceptable activities of MNCs in LDCs 
and particularly in Kenya. It is only from recognizing the 
MNC problems from both ends that policy making cannot only 
61 
be more objective but also beneficial for the symbiotic re-
lationship between LDCs and MNCs economies (putting the 
North/South politics aside). 
In this section, a variety of specific issues will be 
set forth. This would be some of the significant issues 
that LDCs have felt the MNCs have failed to characterize in 
order to contribute to development. Each issue will be 
followed by a response from interviews that have been car-
ried by Frank among the MNC executives from the North indi-
cating the denials or justifications of the way MNCs behave 
in LDCs. These issues will set the theme of the rest of 
this section. Some of the problems and other related is-
sues from these interviews will be discussed as.they relate 
to Kenya. Then in Chapter III we shall discuss some of 
these issues as they relate to labor and resource employ-
ment in Kenya. In Chapter IV, these issues will be dis-
cussed in terms of the development of rural areas and in 
Chapter V their relation on ideological issues will be 
analyzed. 
All in all, these issues will help us in the search 
for policies and solutions less radical but equally or more 
appealing to the development of Third World economies. 
one of the issues involves investments. Thus, first 
the complaint has been that existing firms may be forced 
out of business or may decide to sell out to the Multina-
tionals. Moreover, barriers are created to the entry of 
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new, indigenous entrepreneurs as a consequence of the ad-
vertising, promotion and product differentiation practices 
of MNCs. Secondly, this later practice stimulates demand 
for types of products too sophisticated or inappropriate to 
a poor country's stage of development. According to 
Frank's interview, most British and Japanese denied experi-
encing competition except from other MNCs due to their own 
corporate policies. The British firms invest in sizeable 
markets not being serviced efficiently and move out where 
locals have been effective competitors. The Japanese do 
not produce for local use but to sell in Japan and other 
markets and therefore are not competing with locals. 
In general, MNC retailers claimed they tend to appeal 
to higher income consumers by expanding that market because 
of their quality standards and therefore create their own 
markets than compete for existing markets. They claimed 
that it is their technology, know-how, and capital which 
are beyond capabilities of local entrepreneurs rather than 
promotional advertising and other marketing advantages that 
gives them an edge over locals. 
Another issue has been that MNC firms have been in the 
best position to take advantage of LDC policies in conserv-
ing foreign exchange and encouraging industrialization 
through high degrees of protection. Hence, the stimulus to 
industrialization often fails to benefit the indigenous 
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while it is the local economy that bears the cost in terms 
of higher prices which MNCs take as excessive profits. 
In response, one U.S. firm claimed that it only pro-
duces abroad in order to obtain foreign exchange with which 
to import its own products. Thus B's subsidiary might pro-
duce commodity X in Kenya for exports to obtain foreign ex-
change in order to import its commodity Y for selling in 
Kenya. In any case, the firm claimed that import restric-
tions are imposed for balance of payments reasons rather 
than protecting local industry. The electronics and food 
processing companies, on the other hand, indicated that 
they go abroad to take advantage of cheap labor and other 
factors of production, i.e., in spite of protection mea-
sures. 
Foreign firms have also been accused of refusing to 
unbundle their investment packages which in some cases 
contain investments of strategic national importance and 
could be at lower costs if operated by government (e.g., 
utilities). Frank's findings indicate that extractive in-
dustries are more willing to unbundle than manufacturing 
industries because of national sensitivity to such opera-
tions and also due to lesser flexibility of extracting com-
panies to chose countries in which to invest. Another rea-
son leveled by MNCs is that LDCs consider R and D costs as 
sunk costs and are unwilling to offer reasonable fees. 
Hence, MNCs are unwilling to sell off such operations. 
'One Shot deals' were seen as unattractive financially to 
firms and they are not interested in helping to establish 
competitors either. 
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Critics have pointed out that foreign operations are 
not foreign "investments" in the real sense because they 
commit a small amount of their own capital preferring in-
stead to borrow locally as studies show that only about a 
quarter of foreign investments in manufacturing are di-
rectly financed by parent companies. This is seen as det-
rimental to local enterprise. MNC's main reason for bor-
rowing were said to be minimization of risks such as cur-
rency depreciation, inconvertibility and exposure to na-
tionalization. A British and a German firm claimed that 
actually MNC investments have increased the supply of funds 
to local firms by bolstering the confidence and willingness 
of financial institutions to lend to domestic ventures. 
And because of restrictions to repatriate profits, most 
firms have also reinvested or lent the funds to financial 
institutions for investment borrowings locally. 
On the issue of takeovers, it has been found that al-
most a third of all MNC subsidiaries in LDCs have been 
through acquisition which is regarded as an alienation of 
domestic economy as well as reduction of competition and 
increase of affiliate's dominant position. However, the 
MNCs have claimed that take-overs benefit host countries 
from the infusion of capital, technology, and managerial, 
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marketing, and technical skills. For unsound firms, ac-
quisition prevents certain dislocations associated with 
business failures and their parasitic effects on the econ-
omy. Further, acquisition may be more efficient and bene-
fit LDCs through employment opportunities, upgraded skills 
and potentially low prices for locally produced goods than 
if they were to import. 
A more controversial issue has been the transfer of 
technology. These have been too sophisticated, highly de-
signed and elaborately packaged to meet the needs of poor 
masses. Also the technology is inappropriate since they 
are capital intensive in relation to LDC's excess cheap 
labor thereby intensifying unemployment problems, aggravat-
ing inequalities in income, worsening balance of payments 
by capital imports and even inputs. 
The MNC interviewed responded that local raw materials 
lessen quality given that their appeal is for the high in-
come market. The British and French MNCs emphasized stan-
dardization and reputation of uniform quality and companies 
in pharmaceuticals insisted on their image of not cutting 
corners to adapt to local needs because it would give a bad 
publicity. And in machinery circles, interchangeability of 
parts makes standardization necessary and therefore an MNC 
would rather train the local personnel (as we shall see in 
the General Motors case) than try to adapt. 
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Other arguments were that automated process may even 
be preferred because they often require less skill than 
labor intensive processes, that LDC policies especially on 
restricting employee dismissals encourage use of capital 
and even over-valued exchange rates and tariff concessions. 
On licensing and patenting, LDCs have complained about 
the prices charged, conditions attached such as purchasing 
materials, components or equipment from the licensor, 
limitations in the scope of market and grantback provi-
sions. MNCs' response has been in defense for their com-
petition with other foreign subsidiaries, the restrictions 
protect their quality and image internationally, high 
prices are due to high research costs, etc. 
Related to the issue of patents is the issue of R & D. 
Not only have MNCs been accused of failing to establish R & 
D in LDCs but they have also caused brain drain through 
emigration of scientists and engineers in search for higher 
salaries and research facilities at MNC's home countries. 
In response, the MNCs have claimed each situation of locat-
ing R & Dis unique, e.g., a mining company will establish 
its R & D at source unlike a pharmaceutical company. Other 
firms argued that shortage of skilled personnel locally, 
inadequate market size, etc.; makes it uneconomical to es-
tablish R & D in most LDCs. Hence as an alternative, most 
MNCs contribute financially and/or technologically to local 
facilities, universities and established research 
institutions. This was particularly noted among the U.S. 
firms but other European firms would do so only when the 
research is "highly relevant". 
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In terms of employment issues, most LDCs were found to 
have legislation on training·, upgrading, limitations on the 
number and type of foreign representatives, job protection 
and other labor practices. The MNCs claimed to have ob-
served those rules and in fact their employment practice 
standards exceed requirements of most host governments. 
The only problem has been seen when those rules discrimin-
ate foreign firms and therefore resorted to capital inten-
sive technologies. Most firms reported to other training 
domestically, abroad both on job and/or training institu-
tions. The Japanese firms prefer on-the-job training. 
The issue of economic linkages (both backward and for-
ward) has mainly been in the form of tryinq to integrate 
foreign and local firms by requiring increased content of 
local value added, prohibition of inputs in their raw state 
and· encouragement of further local processing, increased 
use of local engineers and consultants. Few companies have 
had a problem in backward linkages. However, most, especi-
ally extractive firms find it difficult to provide any for-
ward linkages locally because of the required heavy capi-
tal. This is crucial in the Philippines where foreign equ-
ity ownership depends on the level of processing obtained 
locally. In our case, the Kenyan requirement (mostly 
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saving foreign exchange in terms of increased exports - and 
1984 is the export year) is not very extreme. However, 
most firms (but least among Japanese firms) satisfy this 
condition through subcontracting. 
The last issue we shall consider in our findings is 
that of transfer pricing. Critics allege that prices often 
diverge from arm's length prices that would prevail under 
market conditions thereby benefiting MNCs to the detriment 
of host countries. The MNCs however argue that there is no 
basis to value these transactions due to their specificity 
to particular situations of research and this is mostly 
within companies with a high degree of centralization. 
Other firms claimed the extra costs to be due to host 
governments' restrictions on royalty payments, R & E fees, 
limits on dividend and other price controls. Moreover, the 
British, American and German firms face some regulations 
from home that limit this practice as well as the bilateral 
and multilateral agreements between countries. 
These and many more issues are only some of the prob-
lems mushrooming between the MNCs and LDCs relationships. 
As I have mentioned, these issues will be recycled in this 
section under various particular topics as they relate to 
MNC effects on Kenyan economy. But first, we dwell on some 
that are general to all topics that we shall and shall not 
deal with. This will be in the form of some empirical 
findings so far. 
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One such issue that has been of particular interest in 
Kenya is that of transfer pricing. The ILO in Kenya found 
evidence of overpricing of imported intermediate goods from 
the parent company to the extent of 20 or 30 percent more 
than these goods would fetch on the open market (Swainson 
1980:221). ILO's estimate in 1971 in Kenya was said to 
have more than doubled the real outflow of surplus from the 
manufacturing sector as compared with declared profits and 
dividends. This sparked the Kenya government to hire a 
Swiss firm to check on over-invoicing (Swainson 1980:222). 
According to Collin Leys' (1974: 126) writings, 
Another practice which effectively circum-
vented exchange control was the payment of man-
agement fees, consultancy fees, and royalties for 
patents, brand names .... The ILO mission studied 
a sample of ten foreign manufacturing firms and 
found that in 1971 such payments constituted 40% 
of total remittances, and were equal to 67% of 
dividends ... The 1971 budget had imposed a spec-
ial 20% tax on such payments and ... Many compan-
ies which had been making all the three payments 
preferred to go on making them and pay the tax, 
rather than scale them down ..• even in the face 
of tax .•. expanded exchange-control ... to probe 
such practices ... "but" ... Kenya's position as a 
periphery center offering an attractive location 
for the· regional operations of international com-
panies meant that the government could not easily 
afford to become too strict about such matters 
even if it could muster the technical expertise 
to police them. 
And according to Leys, as can be seen on the table be-
low, net private transfer pricing between 1964 and 1970 was 
K.£4.7 millions. 
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The other issue is related to competition; whereas it 
is an established fact that foreign firms have tended to 
monopolize Kenyan markets and therefore lessened competi-
tion, it is also true that some have fostered competition. 
For example, in a special bulletin as "Focus on Computer", 
the weekly review of Kenya made an analysis on the effect 
of ATT's entry into the market will provide a solid alter-
native to IBM and is likely to price at 10 to 15 percent 
below IBM thereby affecting Apple as well. One financial 
analyst, Douglas Cayne, has even suggested that IBM's re-
cent announcement that it would cut prices by between 18 
and 23% is related to ATT's entry (Weekly Review June 22, 
1984: 43). 
Several other firms have too been found to compete 
each other effectively that their monopolistic practices 
are limited to few situations. However, foreign firms' 
domination of the market in Kenya can not be wholly dis-
missed. According to Pearson (1969:133), the Bata Shoe 
Company dominates the Kenyan economy with a growth rate 
averaging over 10% per annum. This kind of domination of-
ten ends up to be exploitative as exemplified by the Brooke 
Bond Tea Company in swainson's (1980:26) study. Through 
its small holder scheme, the firm has been paying very low 
prices for collecting the leaves for processing that one 
farmer was outraged to write a letter threatening to 



































































































































































































































































































I will go in for potatoes, vegetables and cattle which pay 
more in comparison" (Daily Nation, September 20, 1977). 
Brooke Bond's policy of controlling plucking standards has 
also meant that it will be able to purchase the higher 
quality smallholder tea and blend it with its own lower 
quality tea (Swainson 1980:258). 
The benefits however have equally been of significant 
weight. For example, the Kenya Breweries have had a self-
sufficiency that has saved Kenya millions of shillings in 
foreign exchange. According to the Special Bulletin on 
"Focus on Kenya Breweries" (Weekly Review, March 2, 1984: 
23) the brewery contributed K£78 million in 1983 (an amount 
sufficient to finance one of the larger government depart-
ments for an entire year). Others have provided an easy 
means for the government to take over as was the case in 
1969 when the government took over Liebig's meat production 
firm at Athi River (now the large Kenya Meat Commission 
[KMC]) as well as Brooke Bond (third largest foreign firm 
by asset value, 1972) which was forced to sell its shares 
on Nairobi's Stock Exchange (Swainson, 1980:255-
257). 
Other benefits include general increase in manufactur-
ing investments. According to the speech delivered by the 
Chairman of Kenya Association of Manufacturers (Weekly Re-
view, December 16, 1983:20), the manufacturing sector has 
been growing at an average rate of 9.8% per annum. Hence 
only 14% of imports constitute consumer goods compared to 
over 80% at the time of independence {i.e., 20 years ago) 
which implies a developed industrial base to satisfy con-
sumer needs locally. 
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All these generalities in one way or the other affect 
the national economy across all sectors of the economy. 
It's now time to relate some of these particular issues to 
particular topics I have chosen for the analysis due to 
their importance in the Kenyan case. 
CHAPTER III 
LABOR RELATED ISSUES 
Employment Problems 
Labor is one of the most critical inputs and plays a 
very significant role in development. Not only is it pro-
ductive, but it is also the only factor input that can make 
decisions on its productivity and can force to alter the 
trend of operations. Hence the level of national employ-
ment, productivity per worker, etc., are among the import-
ant factors in the measurement of the economy. The MNC's 
effect therefore on such a factor is worth examining. 
It has been known that most of the labor force is em-
ployed in the agriculture sector in Kenya due to high sub-
sistence that persists in the economy. For example, ac-
cording to Kenya's official handbook, in 1980, agro-based 
industries accounted for 55% of employment and 65% of the 
manufacturing sectors share in gross domestic product with 
major contributors being sugar processing, confectionary 
textiles and garments, wood and wood products, pulp and 
paper, fruits, etc. 1 The MNCs have had both the negative 
and positive effects in this sector. For example, because 
of their capital intensive techniques, the amount of labor 
used has been proportionately low. In a study done by 
Swainson on tea production in Kenya, it was found that the 
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Brooke Bond Liebig Corporation has employed the CTC method 
of production which has become popular in the world tea in-
dustry and was introduced into Kenya in the early 1960s. 
This method chops up tea finely by tearing. The method was 
followed by the G.W.A. system of fermenting. Both methods 
were meant to save time and give careful control respec-
tively. However, this technique has also called for im-
proved plucking techniques in order to improve the labor 
productivity. As swainson has indicated, cost of produc-
tion has fallen since 1958, and 12,315 people have been em-
ployed, 121 in management, 189 in supervisory and 10,915 as 
staff (Swainson 1980:253). Thus, on one hand, the Brooke 
Bond Corporation's technology has been labor saving while 
creating employment in other sections. Being the largest 
tea corporation in the country (with more than 85% share) 
besides its employment of labor on its tea estates, other 
private large and small farms have been created due to its 
increased output. As we saw from the previous chapter, tea 
is the second largest export good of Kenya. Consequently, 
any effect in the production of tea would have an impact on 
the nation's economy. 
The MNCs should therefore be sensitive on labor issues 
especially in sectors that affect the national economy. 
Their technologies should be able to make up for lost em-
ployment in some other way because labor is a very sensi-
tive factor of production. The major problem however is 
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that most MNCs don't go into agriculture which supports the 
highest level of employment and are therefore seen as pro-
moting their own interests. For example, according to the 
ILO mission, foreign manufacturing firms in Kenya were more 
capital intensive than their local counterparts. Hence 
total employment in these firms rose by 2% per annum from 
1964 to 1969 while output rose by 9.86 (Leys 1974:138). 
Implicit in this data is the fact that the capital used was 
labor saving. However, it also increased productivity per 
work. Consequently it is very hard to judge the kind of 
impact this has created without further investigations. 
Another product that has interested MNCs from early 
days is the fruit industry. The first incidence started 
with three British firms in the processing of canned pine-
apples with Kenyan canners employing 80% of the industry's 
labor force in 1957. By 1961 it employed 400 workers and 
by 1976 it had over 10,000 workers. However, unlike the 
tea industry which encouraged outgrower farmers, the pine-
apple firm destroyed the outgrower system. Thus, in the 
1960s, the British companies sold to calpak (now Del Monte) 
all their pineapple firms which were consolidated with the 
government's approval. Calpak embarked on a very intensive 
modern scientific technique on its enlarged estates and 
consequently refused to process the outgrower farmers' 
pineapples. In spite of the positive effect on increased 
quality and therefore high exports with saved foreign 
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reserves, Del Monte's image was tarnished as a monopolist 
firm with the aim of making profits. First it had replaced 
the three competing firms. Then it replaced all pineapple 
farmers. Even with increases in firm employment and in-
cluding all other merits that it created, the common person 
had a different perception of Del Monte. Implicit in this 
situation is the fact that MNCs should focus on all angles 
and especially the most sensitive areas or else all their 
merits won't count. Indeed, by employing few technocrats, 
Del Monte contributed to the situation of income concentra-
tion among the few elites as we shall observe in the income 
distribution section by having a few people employed in the 
place of many farmers. 
The Bata Shoe Company (B.S.C.), a British firm with 
more than 80% share of the shoe market, is another example 
of intensive technology that is labor saving. Unlike the 
Calpak (Del Monte) situation which exported most of its 
products and therefore saved foreign reserves, the Bata 
Company produced cheap, low quality products for local use. 
According to Swainson (1980:166-169) Bata produced eight 
million shoes of which only two million were made of 
leather and six million from textile, rubber or plastic. 
Consequently, instead of earning some foreign exchange, 
Bata was only making profits in Kenya. Langdon has noted 
that Bata's sales in Kenya expanded by 66% between 1967 and 
1972 while in 1974, the company made a profit of 
K£1,042,961 (Swainson 1980:268). 
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To make the situation worse, B.s.c. 's intensive tech-
niques were applied on those low quality shoes that were 
produced in large quantities and therefore foregoing more 
labor employment. For example, in 1955, 500 workers pro-
duced 1000 pairs of shoes per day made of leather while the 
low quality shoe section employed only 200 workers who pro-
duceo 1500 pairs a day (i.e., the ratio of 2:1 and 7.5:1 
shoes per person respectively). In 1970, B.s.c. 's 5.5 mil-
lion shoes were from rubber and employed 650 workers while 
two million pairs were of synthetic and had 400 workers 
(i.e., a ratio of 5000:1 and 8462:1, respectively). This 
does not only show how the latter is more labor saving than 
the former but also indicates how B.s.c. in fifteen years 
has drastically emphasized capital intensity, i.e., from 
2:1 to 5000:1 and from 7.5 to 1 to 8462:1 in fifteen years, 
respectively. 
In terms of making boots, the old method produced 500 
pairs of boots using two workers, i.e., 250 each while the 
new method needed 35 workers to produce 800 pairs, i.e. 22 
pairs each. Hence, when in 1974, B.s.c. had doubled its 
employees from the 1954 figure, the output was five times 
that of 1974. Hence not only were the low quality shoes 
neglecting contribution to foreign exchange but were also 
labor saving. Compounding this effect is the fact that 
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this same low quality shoe used the imported inputs. Since 
B.S.C. is a globally integrated company, it imported inputs 
from its own subsidiaries. For example, in the 1950s 
B.s.c. obtained its rubber from its own West African plant-
ations. We can therefore safely say that the B.s.c. is an 
example of a corporation that will cause love/hate rela-
tions between MNCs and the nationals. Most often, the bad 
effects are echoed highly that they generally overshadow 
contributions of corporations such as of Brooke Bond that 
we saw earlier and many more others. Such contributions 
include saving foreign exchange, increasing output and gen-
erating high standards of living through employment and 
labor training. 
One area that MNCs have positively contributed to 
Kenya's labor force is the training of their workers. In 
1970, the Kenyanization Bureau was strict on the schedules 
of replacing foreign expatriates through the provision of 
training (Swainson 1980:233). Based on this program, the 
Kenya National Trading Corporation was set up with the 
first goal of assisting Kenyanization of commerce (Govern-
ment of Kenya, Official Handbook 1983:101). As a result, 
most corporations are engaged in labor training. Indeed, 
the effect has been increased employment levels and greater 
worker participation as evidenced in the Kenya Breweries 
company (KBC, the largest brewing company). The company 
employs 4,000 people and almost all of them have shares in 
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the company. As KBC can now claim "No other company in 
Kenya can match this record of worker participation in the 
equity of the employer's company" (Weekly Review, March 2, 
1984:19). KBC also obtains all its raw materials, goods 
and services within Kenya. The industry has backward links 
to agriculture in that about 1,500 Kenyan farmers supply it 
with barley and have greatly promoted the glass industry 
too. The company has an intensive training program for all 
parts of its operations including engineering, chemists, 
truck drivers and even farm workers. In 1983 alone, KBC 
spent 1.64 million shillings to keep its training facilit-
ies at the highest level, its workers are among the well 
paid with better benefits including housing, interest free 
loans, clinics, medical care with their own village in 
Nairobi consisting of schools, shops, a cinema hall, sport-
ing facilities, etc. 
Other corporations with similar attitudes include the 
sugar industry which employs over 500,000 people with about 
50,000 others as outgrower farmers (Weekly Review, Sept. 
23, 1983:26). The General Motors Corporation which now em-
ploys in excess of 16,000 people, passing technology and 
management skills to Kenyans through training and actually 
providing some exports to neighborin~ countries (Weekly 
Review, Nov., 18, 1983:24). Indeed, Kenya has benefited 
from foreign firms mostly through their exports to the 
neighbors or through its centinpatal effect in the region 
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such as the establishment of regional offices in Nairobi. 
The Shell Company was the first followed by British and 
American Tobacco (B.A.T.) and now most corporations in the 
region have their off ices in Nairobi thereby creating em-
ployment at home and those sent abroad. 
As a result, the employment statistics in Kenya are 
impressive. Thus wage employment rose from 49,500 in 1964 
to 62,594 in 1977 and to 70,504 in 1980 in commerce and in-
dustry (Government of Kenya 1983:97). And in 1983, the re-
corded number of wage employees in the northern sector went 
up by 47,300, i.e., 4.5%. Wage payments rose by 11.4% with 
an average wage earnings rise of 6.6% (Economic survey Re-
port, Ministry of Finance, Weekly Review, June 15, 1984:21 
and Appendices 8 and 9). 
In an overall assessment of the MNC's impact on labor 
related issues, we can assert that there has been a.posi-
tive and negative impact. The negative impact as that por-
trayed by the Bata Shoe Company which used sophisticated 
technology,·few workers, imported raw materials and yet 
sold most of the goods in the country is very discouraging. 
In spite of other developmental effects it might have added 
into the economy, the overall picture is that of quick pro-
fit making that can easily call for an outrageous percep-
tion of all foreign firms. On the other hand, the records 
of firms such as Kenya Breweries are very impressive and 
encouraging. The impact is developmental, domestical and 
patternal to the indigenous. Consequently, in terms of 
policy making, evaluations would better be carried on in-
dividual firms basis in order to promote Kenya's economic 
development. 
Employment Determined Income Distribution 
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Probably the significant effect that the MNCs have had 
on the Kenyan economy is industrialization. We have al-
ready observed the growth of industries in general, how 
their location has been used to earn foreign exchange 
through exports to neighboring countries and how it has af-
fected the national policies of development. In the case 
of income distribution, as a labor related issue we have 
observed that the hiring policies have helped the rich 
more. Thus, firms have often hired people based on their 
political status in spite of the highly qualified personnel 
there are on the streets. 
On the other hand, the more popular someone is in the 
political arena, the more job offers s/he will get as well 
as the higher are the salaries. The consequence has there-
fore been a very unequal distribution of wealth in favor of 
very few individuals as we noted in the previous chapter. 
Another touchy area is the kind of technology used. 
The MNC firms are usually from technologically advanced 
countries which has been improvised to save costs such as 
labor costs. Hence the introduction of such technologies 
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has a great impact on labor in general as well as income 
distribution. Thus only the lucky ~ew will get employment. 
And in view of what we have learned from the previous find-
ings, it's again those with political ties; the elites and 
those who already have large enterprises to be taken over 
by MNCs. Here again, the scale is tipped toward the few 
and therefore poor resource distribution. 
However, it is not all gloomy. Some MNCs technologies 
have been very contributive to economic development. For 
example, whereas some companies introduce their own techno-
logies, some like Brooke Bond do their own research local-
ly. Brooke Bond sponsors the Tea Research Institute at 
Kericho. Thus, local personnel would have an opportunity to 
advance their careers and some of them could start their 
own businesses (Swainson 1980:253). The sugar industry is 
another example that is involved in local research especi-
ally through the Kenya Sugar Authority that undertakes re-
search on soils through the country. This technological 
boost has mainly come from Five-Cail Babcock, a French firm 
at Nzoia (Weekly Review, Sept. 23, 1983:26). Not only does 
this research provide job opportunities but their local 
flavor also blends in the consideration of labor generating 
than saving techniques. Hence, even if the technologies 
that have been imported have caused poor income distribu-
tion, some companies have come out with impressive per-
formances that are worth encouraging in the sphere of 
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technological advancement. We will note ahead under the 
impact on agriculture how some of these corporations' tech-
nologies have indeed increased productivity per worker and 
per acre. We will also note the high quality that effec-
tively competes on world markets thereby importing or sav-
ing some foreign reserves. 
SUMMARY 
Thus in this chapter we discovered some positive char-
acteristics of MNCs in their effect on employment. This 
has been through improved technology, increased training 
and many more social activities. The issue of income dis-
tribution was also observed with mixed characteristics. 
However, the stereotype negative effects leveled against 
MNCs were counterbalanced by the research activities that 
MNCs have helped to promote and thereby increasing techno-
logical advancement - What Schumpeter would consider as the 
major force behind growth and development. 
FOOTNOTES 
1The main industrial structure of the economy is 
based on agricultural production. Kenya - Official Hand-
book 1963-1983, Government of the Republic of Kenya (1983). 
CHAPTER IV 
ISSUES AFFECTING RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
Agricultural Transformation 
As we saw earlier, Kenya is mainly an agricultural 
country and therefore agriculture touches every sphere of 
the nation's economy. So too are the MNCs. Indeed, the 
MNCs have not been very active in this sector in relative 
terms to the size of the sector compared to other sectors. 
However, the few that have participated have had very ef-
fective impacts especially in terms of forward and backward 
linkages. But before we examine these effects,we shall peg 
out points of view on particular empirical and theoretical 
studies that relate to the economies of agriculture. 
According to Colman and Nixon Simon Kuznets (1961) 
summarized the benefits of agriculture to development in 
three ways. First was product contributions in which food 
for the population and industrial crops for non-food uses 
are provided directly from agriculture. Secondly, agri-
culture provides surplus labor for industrial use and net 
capital outflow for the industrial investments, i.e., fac-
tor contribution. Thirdly, is the market contribution 
whereby agriculture provides revenue to farmers for indus-
trial expenditures. Within all these three categories we 
find that there are backward and forward linkages to be 
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generated from the agricultural sector. It is therefore 
upon the MNC to choose which linkage it can provide as well 
as it is to the policy makers to decide which MNC is 
development oriented in terms of agriculture (Colman & 
Nixon 1978:132). 
Theoretically it has been accepted that the higher the 
income, the higher is not only the quantity demanded but 
also the higher the quality of products demanded. Hence,it 
is fitting to use Kuznet's summary in this perspective in 
that as farmers' income increases, more goods in the econ-
omy will be purchased as well as more increased demand for 
industrial products thereby promoting industry. Conseq-
uently, if the MNCs have to grow in themselves, they would 
better encourage new ventures into agriculture as well in 
order to fetch for their own industrial markets (Colman & 
Nixson 1978:132). 
One of the factors disturbing LDCs' relation with MNCs 
has been technological importation. Unlike manufacturing 
however, agriculture is less mechanized and more labor in-
tensive. But within the agricultural sector itself, the 
capital intensity varies. Hence the choice of agricultural 
development strategy has to be made. Thus should farming, 
for example, be large scale or small small scale. Before 
coming to LDC conclusion of relating the size of farming 
scale to the technology as in the case of Argentina and 
other Latin American countries whose lalifundio farms are 
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large and heavily mechanized compared to minifondios and 
microfundios which are small plots of land cultivated with 
simple tools (Todaro 1977:260). In this case therefore, an 
MNC or LDC decision maker looking for capital intensive 
strategy might choose the large scale farming. However, 
from Colman & Nixon's observation, Johnston and Killby 
(1975: Ch. 4) have classified the agricultural development 
strategies into two, i.e., unimodal and bimodal. The uni-
modal strategy is small scale but it is biologically techn-
ologized as is in the case of the Japanese and Taiwanese 
development pattern, i.e., high yielding hybrids, multiple 
cropping, intensive irrigation and fertilizer application, 
etc. The bimodal strategy, on the other hand, is large 
scale along side small scale as is the case of Colombia and 
Mexico where large farms are more mechanized (Colman and 
Nixon 1978:148). Based on these strategies, a decision has 
to be made that will not only have a positive impact on 
agriculture development but also as we have suggested, it 
should have some backward and forward linkages such as on 
labor, industrialization, income distribution and the 
general economy at large. 
Another developmental strategy that has been widely 
recognized is that of land reform. This may involve more 
redistribution of property rights such as having title 
deeds, land consolidation or even in cases of Mexico where 
large chunks of lalifundia were purchased to relocate the 
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landless and the case of Kenya where large farms were sub-
divided to medium sizes to fit Africans' scale of produc-
tion. 
In all these cases, the primary aim has been to foster 
development. Based on these findings, we can therefore de-
termine the impact of MNCs on Kenya's agricultural sector. 
We have seen effects of some of the major corporations such 
as Brooke Bond Liebig, Bata Shoe Company, Calpak (Del 
Monte) in terms of labor saving levels. Now we shall exa-
mine more in terms of technological imports and the link-
ages that have been hindered or created. 
In the case of tea production, Brooke Bond planted its 
own tea on large estates. It also encouraged large scale 
and small scale farmers to sell picked up tea leaves to it 
for processing. Hence, in order to increase the quality of 
tea, Brooke Bond introduced a technology in which only the 
top two leaves were to be plucked for processing. The im-
pact was that the technology was scale neutral in that it 
was applicable to both large and small scales. Indeed, it 
didn't need any mechanization nor labor layoffs. But the 
quality standards were so attractive on international mar-
kets that further land was induced into tea production as a 
form of backward linkage. On the other hand, a packaging 
and distribution network was set up at Kericho (a small 
town where Brooke Bond's factory is located) to cater to 
the firm's needs to commercialize their product both 
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domestically and abroad. Implicit is the forward linkage 
which Brooke Bond can now bargain on for various conces-
sions from the government. In short, we can suggest that 
an MNC that introduces a technology that is counter-reac-
ti ve both backward and forward as did Brooke Bond not only 
stands a better chance of surviving and benefiting but also 
positively contributes to development. 
Another significant case involved the Pan Paper Mills 
at another small town (Webuye). Being the largest paper 
mill on the continent, the Pan Paper has transformed this 
small town into a business enclave of printing presses, box 
manufacturing, packaging and wrapping operations and other 
indirect linkages such as residential buildings, shopping 
malls, health, educational and social facilities including 
agriculture, etc. The sugar factory complex at Nzoia is 
yet another related example. so are enclaves such as the 
Yuken (Yugoslavia/Kenya) textiles at Thika, the Uplands 
Pork and Bacon Company at Uplands (named after the company) 
and the Limuru town which has come up through tanning re-
lated products. All these examples represent major impacts 
on Kenya in that they were started by MNCs in remote areas 
and turned these areas into large urban centers with many 
functions but all resulting from the agricultural operation 
that was started by an MNC. All have had forward and back-
ward linkages. Indeed, some have been of such a landmark 
such as Uplands Company that people can't tell whether 
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Uplands is the name of the major company or the name of the 
township. These examples also explain how MNCs and LDCs 
can benefit from the promotion of agricultural related 
operations. Not only do the MNC develop a long lasting op-
portunity. but the LDC also learns to trust the corporation 
as a development strategy rather than a profit making alien 
entity. 
It is with such contributions that Kenya's agriculture 
has sustained its development pattern. Indeed there have 
been a lot of setback corporations as we saw in the case of 
Calpak. 
Urbanization 
We have already noted that urbanization has caused 
some harm to the rural areas. However, this was in the 
sense that only a few urban areas are absorbing all the 
development opportunities. The question here is whether 
this has been a threatening case in Kenya. Whereas this is 
true to an extent, our study on agriculture in this chapter 
indicated that some MNCs have started in remote areas and 
grown up by creating new urban centers as is the case of 
Nzoia, Thika, Webuye, Limuru, Uplands, etc. All these are 
agricultural related centers that now rank among the top 
cities. It is also worth noting that some many more as we 
saw in Chapter II under Industrial Development have mush-
roomed due to other related operations. Hence, even if the 
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MNCs can be blamed for concentrating in urban areas, some 
many more have interested themselves in rural development. 
This situation has had an impact on both demographic 
and economic gains redistribution. The population migra-
tion has been helped to diversity and therefore the econo-
mic benefits too. This can be cited in the current develop-
ment plan (1984-88 Plan) whose theme is development on dis-
trict levels. Thus, the District Officer is in charge of 
development projects in the district and not on a national 
basis. This way, the political forces will help distribute 
industrial operations away from magnetic enclaves of 
Nairobi and Mombasa. On the other hand, those MNCs that 
have always operated in rural areas with poor communication 
links, complicated administrative bureaucracies and other 
infrastructures can now be paid attention to, to help them 
contribute effectively to national development. They can 
also be conveniently checked when they are not conducive to 
progress. 
Rural/Urban Migration 
It is a well known fact that the rural sectors are 
usually agricultural while the urban sectors are indus-
trialized. In Chapter I we saw how the rural sector has 
been squeezed out off its labor force because of the educ-
ation system and employment expectations. In this chapter 
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earlier on, we found out that agriculture has supplied its 
labor force to the industrial sector which in this sense 
means rural/urban migration. As Todaro has pointed out, 
most of the migrants are of the working age, the educated 
and mostly from the rural areas than from other urban cen-
ters. our interest here is to find out how the MNCs impact 
has influenced this trend. 
Whereas it is baseless to argue that the MNCs have 
been responsible for this disproportionate distribution of 
the Kenyan population relative to work opportunities, there 
is some evidence as we saw in the section dealing with in-
dustrial development that supports this view. Thus, most 
of the MNCs have preferred to locate their operations in 
urban areas than in rural areas. For example, Nairobi, 
Mombasa, Nakuru and Kisumu are the industrial magnets in 
the country with many MNC administrative offices and in-
dustries. A corroborating factor as we have already in-
dicated is the fact that most MNCs are not involved in 
agriculture and logically therefore cannot be found in the 
rural areas where agriculture is dominant. 
The ultimate fear of the rural/urban migration is the 
stagnation of the rural sector due to loss of manpower, on 
one hand and the urban unemployment and crime that in-
creases with the level of immigration on the other. It has 
however not quite been established that the rural sector in 
Kenya has lost that alarming number of workers. Some 
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studies have actually shown that a principle of economics 
is involved. Not only have the benefit/costs analysis been 
calculated by the rural emigrants but Oucho and Makras have 
found out that Kenyan new migrants into urban centers have 
been a major link between the rural and urban areas. They 
frequently communicate back and forth and since they are 
not secure in their new environment, they keep holding the 
strings back in the rural areas in the form of investments, 
gifts and even politically carrying transformation messages 
to the urban administrative centers. However, on average, 
the MNCs location in urban centers and their disinterest in 
agriculture has a lot to say about the unequal distribution 
of income, social amenities, development opportunities, 
etc., between the rural and urban areas. They have a lot 
to say about the false expectations of the young generation 
in terms of education, job opportunities and life in gen-
eral. So, too, are the urban crimes due to frustrations, 
health hazards due to increased slums, poor sanitation, in-
dustrial fumes and other related social activities. It is 
upon the MNC and the government therefore, that coordina-
tion of operations is balanced in a way that rural/urban 
migration is not a development hazard. 
One thesis on rural underdevelopment has been that of 
labor loss to the urban centers. According to the depend-
ency school of thought we saw earlier, the urban centers 
act as magnets attracting all the economic resources from 
the rural periphery. On the other hand, they also absorb 
all the .external economic resources thereby denying the 
rural areas any access to such amenities. 
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Since labor is more mobile, it has been at the center 
of these discussions even more than other factors. The 
main causes have been attributed to the MNC locational pol-
icies as well as the education system which indirectly is 
also linked to the MNC operations. It has been argued that 
because of the possible job opportunities, luxurious living 
standards created and the non-laborious technical kind of 
jobs provided have inappropriately influenced a stream of 
labor immigrants floating in urban areas unproductively. 
Therefore, it is further argued, the rural areas have lost 
their previous trades and are further to lose future oppor-
tunities. 
It is debatable as to whether the MNC holds all the 
responsibility of rural underdevelopment. Whereas studies 
like those of Oucho and Makais are in favor of this labor 
migration based on their findings it is equally true that 
the MNCs have also helped to diversity labors points of im-
migration as well as broadening their sphere of experi-
ences. Given some firms that have established their opera-
tions in the rural areas including industrial operations, 
e.g., the car assemblies outside Nairobi, ship building and 
repairs outside Mombasa, paper factory in Webuye and many 
agriculture related industries that are flooding the rural 
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areas, it's hard to justify this dependence school of 
thought. And now that the government has taken the dis-
trict level development projects approach, it is more 
likely that this emigration trend will dwindle. 
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Since most of the emigrants have been of ages 20-30 
and educated, it can also be argued that these people had 
not been very productive in the rural areas previously due 
to their schooling and lack of resources to use in produc-
tion. Consequently they don't represent a loss at the pre-
sent except for a future opportunity which could equally 
represent a future opportunity in town without guarantees. 
Now that MNCs have infiltrated the rural areas, they are 
more likely to tap this resource for a better use in rural 
development. 
Another argument forwarded in favor of rural/urban 
migration has been leveled on the basis of land subdivi-
sion. According to LDC land tenure systems, the land be-
longs to the family and has to be subdivided into smaller 
pieces in every generation. As the size decreases, so are 
the economies of scale as well as the impossibilities of 
using various kinds of technologies. This means low pro-
ductivity per worker and thus low income. The emigration 
trend is therefore a kind of safety valve to allow land 
pressure escape to avoid the multhusian kinds of population 
hazards. Thus, the fewer the workers in the rural areas, 
given a certain income (which might even increase due to 
-~ 
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economies of scale and other technological applications 
possible) the average per capita income in the rural areas 
will rise. With higher incomes, economics theory predicts 
high savings and therefore high investments that break the 
development bottlenecks inherent in rural areas. Together 
with the MNC supplemental assistances, labor emigration 
from the rural areas might turn out to be a plus to rural 
development. 
However, some regions of Kenya are under-populated and 
need more labor to break through the poverty circle. Hence 
emigration from these areas would be disastrous. One of 
the remedies would be government initiatives to encourage 
economic opportunities to harness this labor flow. The 
MNCs would be another alternative as has been the case of 
the Mwea Tabere irrigation scheme financed by the govern-
ment as well as international firms and organizations pro-
viding financial and technical assistance that has trans-
formed a previously poor and depopulated region to an envi-
able resettled agricultural land. 
It is with this background that the government policy 
makers and politicians should analyze the possibilities of 
screening and using MNCs to curb or promote rural/urban 
migration in order to develop the rural areas. 
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Rural Development 
One of the fundamental issues of development involves 
income distribution between individuals as well as between 
regions. Whereas in most LDCs, the rural sector always 
lags behind national development, the important factor to 
be noted is what steps are being taken to improve the situ-
ation. Initially, we should note that most of the rural 
sector is agricultural as opposed to the urban sector which 
is usually industrial. Here we deal with agriculture in 
terms of rural development but save its full analysis for a 
later section. 
Thus generally speaking, any step taken to develop the 
agricultural sector will directly or indirectly affect the 
development of the rural sector. Hence as we shall see, a 
firm like Brooke Bond (a British multinational firm produc-
ing tea) gets credit for its promotion of agriculture in 
the rural areas. Thus in the 1950s Brooke Bond built four 
new factories in the rural areas and in the 1960s three 
more were built (Swainson 1980:251). The consequence was a 
source of income to the rural inhabitants both through the 
selling of their output as well as direct employment in the 
factory. 
Another industry with significant contribution to the 
rural development has been the textile industry. For ex-
ample, Kicomi (Kisumu Cotton Mills) has encouraged the 
growth of cotton around Kisumu and the whole lake basin 
I 
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region as well as other rural regions of the country since 
cotton is cheap to transport. Rivatex (Rift valley Tex-
tile) is another textile corporation that has promoted wool 
production in the Rift Valley region as well as the rest of 
the country. Other textiles include Yuken (Yugoslavia-Ken-
ya) textiles and KTM (Kenya Torrey Mills) textiles from Jap-
an. All these corporations, even if they located their in-
dustries in fast growing small urban centers, have nonethe-
less promoted the adjacent rural areas through backward 
linkages in terms of agriculture and employment and forward 
linkages in terms of retail shops, product availability at 
cheap prices, contributions to local institutions such as 
schools, clinics and other rural projects. 
Many more corporations are involved with agricultural 
development including Calpak (now Del Monte) in fruits, 
Bata Shoe Company in wattle trees and skins, Uplands in 
bacon, Kenchic in chicken, etc. All these, in spite of 
their negative impacts have also striven to improve the 
standards of living in rural areas. The most detrimental 
factor being their mode of technology. And as it is typi-
cal with most foreign firms, their technologies are usually 
resource saving. As Hicksian technical progress definition 
specifies that technology could be neutral, labor saving or 
capital saving. It is further added that all technical 
progress reduces the amount of labor or capital to produce 
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the same amount of output (Salvatore 1983:153). Hence we 
can conclude that the more technical the MNC operations 
are, the lesser the resources it will use within the 
country and therefore the lesser will be its contributions 
to national economic development. This means holding its 
forward linkages constant. 
It is with this view that the Bata industry has been 
blamed for using imported resources and yet selling almost 
all of its products in Kenya. 
One more significant developmental strategy in the 
rural areas has been contract farming. This is a mode of 
farming whereby the poor peasantry without initial capital 
except land would contract with the MNC through a state or-
ganization to receive seeds, machinery, technical advice, 
transport facilities, etc., in return for selling the crop 
to the assisting MNC which will deduct the expenses from 
the revenue. The most notable have been the tea and sugar 
agri-business. A study by Hansen and Marcussen (Review of 
African Political Economy #23, 1982:9) has uncovered the 
means through which the peasantry have defied the depend-
ence model and proved that international capital could be a 
means of emancipation and not emiserization. Accordingly 
out of the $200 million revenue from tea exports, 40% stems 
from small holder production. Annual payments to farmers 
has been therefore $60 million, i.e., K.Sh 450 with a rough 
estimate of K.Sh 4000 average income to contract farmers. 
This represents approximately $400 which is twice the na-
tional average income per capita. 
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The same procedure is practiced in the sugar industry 
with the main MNCs being the Booker McConnell Agricultural 
firm from Britain and its subsidiary Fletcher and Stewart 
Company. From this study, the authors conclude that con-
tract farmers are economically better off with better hous-
ing, more consumption goods and higher possibilities of 
educating their children. 
CHAPTER V 
IDEOLOGICALLY RELATED ISSUES 
Educational Ideology 
Education is a very significant social factor in de-
termining economic development. Indeed the basic struc-
tural ideology of development is intrinsically reflected in 
the education system in Kenya. So much that one of the 
major debates in the current development plan is to re-
structure the whole education system from primary to uni-
versity level. The backward linkage that exists between 
the industrial echelon and the educational quarters has 
previously been that of offering jobs to the highly edu-
cated rather than the highly qualified. Thus, the level of 
education determines the level of the bid for a job oppor-
tunity. This bidding level in turn influences the stud-
ent's false expectations and wrong decisions. We saw 
earlier how the education system inherited from the colon-
ial system was carried on through the years even if its 
purpose had long been served. This extension in some sense 
can be connected to the issue at hand, i.e., the MNC ef-
fects. 
As much as the colonial administrative demands were 
imposed on the education system to train administrators, so 
have been the MNCs' demand for corporate branch managers, 
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accountants, secretaries, etc. However, the MNC's posi-
tions available are so few relative to the population that 
expects to join the MNC work force. Partial blame still 
holds on the government's planning but further investiga-
tions as we saw earlier point out that it is the MNCs that 
offer very excessive salaries, prestigious positions and 
luxurious benefits. The power of these amenities happen to 
outweigh the students' alternative decisions in terms of 
self employment. With sophisticated technologies of auto-
mation, the pride of working for an IBM and the exotic ties 
that can be made out are so compelling in decision making. 
And as Appendix 9 can show, the incomes of the skilled bus-
iness owners are higher than those unskilled. Hence the 
rationale that unemployment after joining the corporation 
is not severe because the unemployed can start their own 
operations. This is a positive contribution by the MNCs 
but is not a solution. 
It is therefore worth considering the possibilities of 
a diversified education system that is geared towards the 
multiplicity of employment opportunities such as technical, 
handcraft, agriculture, commerce and many more related 
fields that would enable a student to be self employed. 
The corporations can contribute in this field by entering 
into operations that require the related skills. Thus, not 
only would they be able to absorb some of the labor force 
but will also influence local initiative into such 
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ventures. For example, baskets in Kenya were made for per-
sonal uses and very little commerce was involved on a very 
short extent. When a foreign firm from Uganda moved into 
this field to produce baskets and sell them back in its 
home country, a group of Kenyan entrepreneurs came together 
and organized the unemployed (mostly women) to form a pro-
duction association of making baskets. Today, polytechnic 
schools have mushroomed all over the country based on the 
idea of handcraft employment of which basket making is one 
of the booming ventures. Baskets are sold both at home and 
abroad as far as the U.S. and Europe. 
Another form of contribution that MNCs could avail to 
the education system is by apprentice or formal training of 
their employees. Earlier on we saw firms like Kenya Brew-
eries as being an example of this contribution. The case 
of General Motors is also worth noting. GM's training pro-
gramme in Kenya is comprehensive but flexible, ranging from 
straight on-the-job instruction and close supervision to 
perhaps scholarship academic courses at GM's private col-
lege at Flint in Michigan. There are also classroom sys-
tems developed by the corporation over many years modified 
where necessary for local application. In addition, a sel-
ected supervisory staff are sent overseas for further 
specialization training. Dealers and their employees have 
the opportunity to progress their own business through 
formal courses, seminars, and workshops at the plant 
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training center in merchandising and general commercial 
subjects as well as vehicle maintenance and service tech-
niques (Inside Kenya Today, #52, June 1981:34). 
Political Ideology 
Carrying our analysis from Chapter I we can observe 
that the MNCs influence on Kenyan politics is very signifi-
cant. Since the political factor is very important in any 
economic analysis, we shall need to note an overview of 
this factor. The three items to be considered are the gen-
eral national ideology, internal politics and the interna-
tional relations. 
Generally, Kenya is a democratic government which be-
lieves in an elected parliament, the independent judiciary 
system and maintenance of law and order. This is essenti-
ally a Western oriented ideology in that within it is the 
enshrinement of a free enterprise system. However, unlike 
the U.S. system, the Kenyan system involves a planned econ-
omy through which the government pinpoints the target econ-
omic projects to be implemented. In some other projects, 
the government singularly or jointly works on particular 
projects to later on run them or hand them to private en-
terprises. 
The MNC has played a significant role in the nurture 
of this ideology. Thus, after Independence, most of the 
big British conglomerates such as Lonrho, Bauman, MacKenzie 
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Delgety, etc., were so diversified product wise and inter-
national wise that there grew a ne~d to monitor their oper-
ations in the country. On the other hand, their immense 
power couldn't allow complete government control. Hence, 
an indicative plan which could use inducements towards cer-
tain targets became the appropriate alternative. This 
meant free enterprise in a planned economy. 
Other factors too contributed to this system. Some 
were, in fact, the creations of the MNC. We have already 
noted how the MNC hiring policies created an elite bour-
geoisie. Because of the wealth they have obtained through 
directorships of various MNCs and thereby made huge invest-
ments as is the case for the Karumes, Njonjos, the Blocks, 
etc., these peoples' political careers rest on the exist-
ence of the free enterprise system. Hence, the internal 
politics surrounds the issues of benefits and costs of 
MNCs. Hence such events as the boardroom crisis which we 
noted earlier (Swainson 1980:280) whereby the Kenyan Dir-
ector who is a politician had not only stood up for the 
company's activities in the country but also defended it at 
its headquarters against the British government's wish to 
regulate its foreign activities on the basis of the free 
enterprise system. rt is therefore worth noting that the 
MNCs have had a significant role in shaping the internal 
political ideology of Kenya. 
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Likewise, the MNCs have had some effect on Kenya's in-
ternational politics. Thus, with the neighbors, this has 
come about through the supply of manufactured commodities 
from MNCs as we noted earlier in the thesis. We saw how 
Kenya exported more goods to its neighbors than it imported 
(Leys & Robson 1965:233-235). We then noted the collapse 
of the East African community as being due to this trade 
inequality. The MNC therefore had a role to play. On the 
other hand, Kenya's highest trading partner is the U.K. 
(see Appendix 6). It also happens that most of the MNCs in 
Kenya are of British origin. In spite of the historical 
fact that Britain was a colonial mother to Kenya, the Brit-
ish MNCs too have contributed a lot to the maintenance of 
this current ideology. 
Most significant is its position as a non-aligned 
country welcoming both investments from the west and East, 
North and South and even from military-run governments. 
The inherent rationale is that of free enterprise which we 
have noted to be impressed by MNCs. 
SUMMARY 
We have seen the economic problems facing a developing 
nation that relates the impact of the Multinational Corpor-
ations. In the first chapter we reviewed various economic 
theories and concepts as they relate to development of the 
Kenyan economy in general. We found that Kenya was econo-
mically better off than its neighboring countries and that 
without protectionism, Kenya would have benefited even 
more. 
In trying to examine how the Kenyan economy has man-
aged to be in that position in Chapter II, we found the 
issue of the Multinational Corporations which had existed 
there before independence. These MNCs have virtually con-
trolled most of the economy but also posed some serious 
problems. These problems were then examined in individual 
sections such as were labor related issues in Chapter III, 
rural development issues in Chapter IV and ideologically 
related issues in Chapter v. These were considered to be 
the leading issues that the MNCs have had an impact on both 
positive and negative. 
Since this paper was meant to investigate most of the 
charges leveled on MNCs, a lot of the effort was put into 
bringing to the attention of some of the positive effects 
of MNCs that are often ignored. We found several of these. 
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contributions in terms of labor employment, technological 
and managerial skills transfer, creation of urban centers 
in rural areas as well as shaping the ideological view 
points towards the economic mechanisms of efficiency as 
guided by the goal of profitability. 
These effects were most reflected in the years from 
1960 to 1980. The 1960s actually reflect Kenya as being 
closely at the same level with its neighbors (Appendices 
14, 15 and 16). However, the 1970s reflect Kenya's new 
policy of encouraging multinational corporations (Append-
ices 8 and 9). The consequent results reflect Kenya as hav-
ing changed faster than its neighbors (Appendices 17, 18 
and 19). such effects therefore were found to have a posi-
tive image of the multinational corporations on Kenya. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the facts revealed, and under the Economic 
Conditions prevailing, Kenya's problem with MNCs should not 
focus on issues of whether MNCs are acceptable in the 
country but how to co-exist with them. Given the current 
elites' position, who indeed are the ones against MNCs, the 
competitive edge posed by MNCs might never be replaced and 
efficiency might be a dream. It is therefore on this basis 
that I set my recommendation, i.e., how to co-exist and how 
to be efficient in decision making. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
One of the major problems in all the issues we dis-
cussed was the transfer of inappropriate technologies. The 
criteria most cited was that of labor saving technologies 
which the MNCs are very fond of. If we have to take a 
micro point of view, labor saving technologies create unem-
ployment problems. However, on a macro basis, we need to 
evaluate the overall effect of such a technology on the 
economy. By this I include the effect of revenues created 
such as direct corporate income tax, employee taxes, skills 
transferred (technical and managerial), foreign exchange 
savings, backward and forward linkages generated and a 
chain of other benefits. These are to be balanced with the 
burden of technology on the economy. Given such informa-
tion, a labor saving technology might turn out to be a very 
essential technology to the economy. 
For example, we found out that Calpak's technology was 
labor saving in terms of farming operations. We also found 
that the technology was aimed at producing high quality 
fruits for international marketing. Given that these 
fruits are exported to various parts of the world, there is 
a whole set of multiplier effects on factors such as trans-
portation, workers, administrative agencies, income taxes, 
etc., that have been generated to consider. In this case, 
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this venture might turn out to be encouraging. As a policy 
tool therefore, a cost/benefit analysis will be very es-
sential to determine the acceptability of any given techno-
logy. The major criteria that I suggest is the contribu-
tion to the financial status of the economy. Preserving 
jobs that become a burden to the economy is not any better 
than burdening the economy with unemployment. Hence, spec-
ial interest criteria that sway away from the positive fin-
ancial cost/benefit balance should be put on the second 
best principle, i.e., other factors should only be con-
sidered when the cost/benefit analysis cannot work. 
Another problem we discovered was the tendency of MNCs 
to shift towards manufacturing industrial production than 
agricultural. The issue is that most of the Kenyan economy 
is dominated by agriculture and therefore in order to nur-
ture the economy foreign enterprises are supposed to in-
dulge themselves in agricultural related activities of 
which most do not. Thus, if MNCs are not involved in such 
a large sector of the economy then they are not after pro-
moting development. 
Whereas a large sector of the national economy is very 
important in development strategy, it is equally question-
able about the appropriateness of emphasis on such a sec-
tor. Put objectively, the primary purpose of any business 
is to earn revenue in the most optimum way. Naturally 
therefore, if foreign enterprises are more interested in 
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the industrial sector, then it is most likely that this 
sector is more attractive. It is therefore upon government 
policy makers to use such tendencies as measuring scales 
for the appropriateness of any development strategy. Given 
that the law of demand and supply operates, and allowing 
for some corrections in the assumptions behind the theory, 
it would be more useful to employ a cost/benefit analysis 
of the contributions of each sector in the economy before 
putting any emphasis on a particular sector. For example, 
we all know the importance of food for any nation. But us-
ing a hypothetical case, supposing we use the comparative 
theory approach that we analyzed in Chapter I. The cost of 
producing corn is several times lower in the United States 
than it is in Kenya due to large scale mechanization. On 
the other hand, the cost of assembling watches, electronic 
equipment and most other repetitive jobs is lower in Kenya 
than in the U.S. due to the high supply of cheap labor. 
From the Kenyan perspective, it should be worth the effort 
of attracting an MNC that introduces such technical opera-
tions whose man/hour output will more than compensate for 
the man/hour output of foods that can be imported cheaply. 
Thus, if parts could be imported and assembled products 
such as watches exported cheaply, then the development 
strategy should lean towards such a sector. 
We also noted the issue of stiffening competition. In 
the study of capitalism, competition is viewed as a healthy 
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sign of economic growth. It is the most efficient means of 
resource allocation. However, in the real world, perfect 
competition is only hypothetical. We have monopolies, oli-
gopolies with all sorts of product differentiation, pre-
datory operations and many kinds of interventions. Hence, 
if a national economy or strategic operations are left in 
the hands of foreign firms alone, the results might be det-
rimental to the economy. Hence, policy makers should at-
tempt to pave means through which national firms are pro-
tected from unfair competition. The criteria of unfairness 
will include parameters such as the required capacity for 
efficient operation, i.e., a local firm should be protected 
up to a point where its size is at the optimum output. An-
other parameter would be where a foreign firm's marginal 
cost is above the price charged. In such a case, investi-
gations should be made in case there are predatory inten-
tions. Other parameters should be used to evaluate parti-
cular areas that need protection (except for those that are 
sensitive to the national security whereby secrecy over-
rules efficiency). 
However, the problem is to determine the accuracy of 
such parameters. For example, what is the optimum level of 
output for a particular firm in Kenya whose counterpart is 
located in the United States? Both firms have a variety of 
differences in terms of inputs and may require different 
procedures based on costs. But as a policy maker, it is 
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worth using the best judgement, such as the industry's 
average cost internationally with allowances for Kenyan 
positive and negative conditions. Thus, refusing entrance 
of foreign firms just because of fear of competition in its 
entirety is detrimental to the nation's economic develop-
ment. On the other hand, open door policies without con-
sideration of factors that stifle competition is as detri-
mental. overall, the criteria should be based on long-
range benefits over costs. After all, if the primary goal 
is development, it shouldn't matter who brings about that 
development. As long as the means are fair and the long 
run results are impressive, policy makers should develop no 
bias of whom to rubber stamp for the initiation or process-
ing of any particular economic project. 
The costs of evaluating the basis of selection is also 
very critical. The analysis of benefits and costs should 
only go as far as the future expected payoffs warranty. As 
a rule of thumb, however, where the balance evens out, the 
local entrepreneurs should be given pre-emptive opportun-
ity. 
The problem of urban/rural development is another is-
sue whose MNC's impact has had a significant effect. On 
one hand, the MNCs have tended to mushroom their operations 
in urban areas and therefore facilitated economies of scale 
on which other economic entities could be established. On 
the other hand,. the Marxists would view this approach as 
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being static and not dynamic. Thus, it has been argued 
that the urban areas act as satellite centers which attract 
development opportunities away from the rural areas (peri-
phery) and therefore bring about unfairly unbalanced 
growth. Since most MNCs are located in urban areas, they 
are therefore equally guilty of creating such an economic 
environment. With certain qualifications therefore the 
MNCs have contributed to regional disparities such as exist 
between Nairobi, Mombasa, Nakuru, Kisumu, etc., and other 
urban areas as well as between all large urban areas and 
rural areas. 
Based on the possible negative impact that may ensue, 
it is therefore essential that policy makers objectively 
formulate viable policies that can promote both regions in 
the most efficient but productive way. In any case, the 
long run effects should be put in perspective. For exam-
ple, some firms which are footloose have been found in 
Nairobi. Given such a· characteristic firm, policy makers 
would be doing the nation a service if they pushed them to 
the rural areas and allowed more firms into Nairobi if 
those firms are attached to operations in Nairobi through 
backward or forward linkages. Forcing footloose firms to 
locate somewhere else is cheaper since the costs of crowd-
ing in Nairobi may outpace the gains. And with new growing 
urban centers distributed all over the country, the margin-
al costs of developing a particular rural project may fall 
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due to economies of scale to be obtained from the new town. 
For example, costs of electric power, telephone lines, 
water pipelines, roads, etc., would be shared as we saw in 
the case of Webuye Paper Mills that has transformed a small 
township with low economic potential to a very strategic 
economic satellite. 
Related to the above is the land tenure system. The 
rural areas will not develop fast without effective polic-
ies governing land use and tenancy. In Chapter II we sug-
gested a policy of penalties for under-utilization of land 
and incentives for its efficient use. The scale of land is 
also as important. In order to use land efficiently, the 
economic laws that govern other commercial sectors should 
apply. Whereas subsistence farming has done a great ser-
vice to the poor peasants, there is need to transform this 
method into more productive ways so as to break through the 
poverty barriers. Therefore, the size of the farm should 
suit the kind of farming. For example, it would be unecon-
omical for a five acre farm to support five cows that de-
pend on grass alone for food without supplemental intensive 
care. And the excessively large farms should be subdivided 
into smaller economical sizes. 
The policy makers should therefore educate peasant 
farmers that land subdivision within the family drains out 
the economies of scale unless scientifically managed. 
Large scale farmers should be aware of benefits from 
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optimum land use so as to use it intensively as small scale 
farmers or else some portions of it. As any commercial 
enterprise, the main objective should be profitability of 
any venture that a farmer goes into. With such a tangible 
incentive, a farmer is more likely to efficiently use re-
sources at his disposal. And given that MNCs are encour-
aged to locate their operations in these rural areas, econ-
omies of scale are likely to benefit both parties. Not 
only would MNCs provide markets for farm products but also 
the starting capital, contribution to infrastructure and 
the shaping of attitudes towards efficiency and commercial-
ization of farm products. With these, specialization into 
a particular product will be possible. The landless can 
therefore find other occupations that are related to links 
between MNC and farming operations. 
In sum therefore, policy makers should discourage MNC 
locations into major urban centers unless absolutely neces-
sary. This way, the MNC operations in the rural regions 
would help foster the growth of other rural economic po-
tentials. Incentives should be used to encourage these 
MNCs spread effects as long as the costs do not outweigh 
the benefits. Indeed, like any other resource input, an 
MNC should be evaluated as any capital item to be injected 
into the economy. 
In Chapter II we found out that foreign political 
ideologies infested through MNCs have complicated economic 
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operations into political power fighting scenarios. In-
deed, the major economic problem, as we mentioned earlier, 
in LDCs has been political. Choices of which MNCs to wel-
come are likely to be biased, so as to the criteria used. 
It is therefore fundamental that the political system is 
shaped appreciably before most of the cohesive beneficial 
economic policies can be upheld. Whereas, as an economist, 
I can't dwell deeply in political theorizing, it is equally 
essential that economic policies govern political policies 
towards economic development. Thus, a political decision 
that chooses an MNC with high costs relative to the other 
without further objective and verifiable qualifications 
should be objected. Politicians should avoid rule of thumb 
policies when dealing with economic issues. For example, 
unemployment cannot just be solved overnight by a "back-to-
the-land" policy. Planning, evaluation and practicability 
are vital. It is the long run impact of the MNC that 
should be considered, not the current political ties it 
has. 
Tied into this issue is the choice based on the MNC 
originality. Economic issues should minimize political and 
ideological boundaries. Thus, the choice of whether to 
choose a firm from a capitalist of socialist state should 
be governed by the firm's overall impact. Once again, the 
question of efficiency and utilization of local resources 
arise. Several economic criterias should be used, such as 
where it wants to locate, probable linkages it will pro-
vide, technological breakthroughs, availability of local 
inputs and serviceability, as well as likelihood of con-
vertibility to local ownership. 
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It is true that the world is becoming smaller and cop-
ing up with the international environment should be the 
basis of any policy making - with the current MNCs pheno-
mena, coexistence is a given fact for economic development, 
the issue is how to optimize the situation. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Bartiz, F. L. R., "Trade Theory, Distribution of Income, 
and Immigration", The American Economic Review, May 
1983. 
Bhagwati, J. N., Brecher, R.A., and Hatla,T., "The 
Generalised Theory of Transfers and Welfare: 
lateral Transfers in a Multilateral World". 
American Economic Review, September 1983. 
Bi-
The 
Blood, w. J., "Business Conditions in East Africa", 
Management Looks at Africa, 1966 (Library of Congress 
Card Number 66-24179). 
Caves, R. E. "MultinationalEnterprise and Economic Analy-
sis." Cambridge University Press (1982). 
Clark, P. G., Development Planning in East Africa." East 
African Studies 21 (Kenya Litho Ltd., 1965). 
Colman, D. and Nixson, F. 
Developed Countries." 
"Economics of Change in Less 
Halsted Press Book (1978). 
Eiteman, D. K. and Stonehill, A. I., "Multinational Busi-
ness Finance", Third Edition (Addison-Wesley 
Publishing Co., 1982). 
Frank, I. "Foreign Enterprises in Developing Countries." 
John Hopkins University Press {1981). 
Forrester, M. w., "Social Prerequisites for Economic 
Development." Kenya Today (N.V.D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 
1962). 
Gurley, J. G., "The Triumph of Capitalism". Challengers of 
Capitalism (W. w. Norton & Co. 1979). 
Killick, T., "Past and Future Research on the East African 
Economies", Eastern Africa Economic Review December 
1976, volume 8, Number 1. 
"Strengthening Kenya's Development Strategy: 
Opportunities, Constraints", Eastern Africa Economic 
Review, Dec. 76, Vol. 8, #2. 
Kindleberger, c. P., and Herrick,B. "Economic Develop-
ment." McGraw-hill Book Company (1983). 
123 
Langdon, s. w., Multinational Corporations in the Political 
Economy of Kenya, (St. Martin's Press, N.Y., 1981). 
Leys, Collin, "Foreign Capital", Underdevelopment in Kenya 
University of California Press 1974). 
Leys, c. and Robson, P., "Appendix", Federation in East 
Africa (Oxford University Press 1965). 
Marvel, H. P. and Ray, E. J., "The Kennedy Round: Evidence 
on the Regulation of International Trade in the United 
States", The American Economic Review, March 1983. 
Morris, P. and Somerset, A., The African Entrepreneur 
(African Publishing Corporation, 1971). 
Mutharika, B. W. T., Toward Multinational Economic Coopera-
tion in Africa (Praeger Publishers, 1972). 
Nehrt, L. c., "The political climate for private foreign 
investments", (Praeger Publishers, 1970). 
Ogendo, R. B., Industrial Geography of Kenya (East African 
Publishing House, 1972). 
Oser, J., "Rich and Poor Countries," Promoting Economic 
Development (Northwest University Press 1967). 
Oucho, D. J. and Makras, M. s., "Migration, Transfers and 
rural developement - A case study of Kenya" (East 
African Literature Bureau, 1984). 
Pearson, D. s., "Industrial Development in East Africa." 
Studies in African Economics 2, (Oxford University 
Press, 1969). 
Salvatore, D. "International Economics." Macmillan 
Publishing Co., Inc. (1983). 
Seidman, A., "An Economics textbook for Africa", Third 
Edition (Methuen London and New York, 1982). 
Swainson, N., "The State and Economy in Kenya." The 
Development of Corporate Capitalism in Kenya~-
1918-1977, (University of California Press, 1980). 
Todaro, M. P., Economic Development in the Third World. 
Second Edition, (Longman 1981). 
Todaro, M. P., Struggle for Economic Development (Read-
ings). (Longman 1983). 
124 
Vernon, R. and Wells, L. T., ftMoving Goods Across National 
Borders•. Economic Environmetn of International 
Business (Prentice Hall, Inc. 1981). 
Zajadacz, P., Studies in Production and Trade in East 
Africa (Weltforum Verlag. Munchen 1970). 
zwanenberg, R. M. A. and King, A., •East African and 
Economic Federation•, An Economic History of Kenya and 
Uganda 1800-1970 (Humanities Press 1975). 
•Development Plan 1984-1988.ft Government Printers, Nairobi 
(1983). 
•Kenya, Foreign Investment in a Developing Economy.ft A 
Business International Research Report, 1980 (Library 
of Congress Card Number 80-81285). 
•Kenya, Progress and Problems.• British Information ser-
vices, 1960. 
•Kenya, Official Handbook.ft Government of the Republic of 
Kenya (1983). 
ftStrengthening Kenya's Development Strategy: Opportunit-
ies, Constraints.ft Eastern Africa Economic Review, 
Dec. 76, Vol. 8, #2. 
•The Economic Development of Kenya.ft International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development. (Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1963). 
Kenya Today (Number 52 -June 1981). Stellascope Printing 
Company, Nairobi (1981). 
Weekly Review News Magazines, Kenya, Stelescope Printers 
(NRB) Publications: September 23, 1983 
October 7, 1983 
November 11, 1983 
November 11, 1983 
December 16, 1983 
March 2, 1984 
June 15, 1984 
June 22, 1984 











Sodium Carbonate 5.0% 
Skins 3.0% 
SOURCE: Overseas Economic Survey, Swainson, p. 46 (The 
Development of Corporate Capitalism in Kenya). 
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APPENDIX 2 
Kenla's Major Trade Partners 
($ millions) 
(Excluding EAC Partners) 
% Increase 
Im12orts 1976 1977 1978 77/78 
EEC 391 577 912 58.2 
U.K. 185 165 394 138.8 
Germany 98 146 237 62.7 
Japan 108 133 183 37.7 
Iran 164 115 121 5.7 
U.S. 57 76 111 45.7 
France 31 66 83 25.7 
Italy 21 55 90 63.2 
Ex12orts 
EEC 285 584 465 - 20.4 
U.K. 87 160 155 - 3.4 
Germany 101 216 154 - 28.9 
Netherlands 4 129 66 - 49.2 
U.S. 4 69 50 - 28.1 
Zambia 22 17 15 - 11.0 
Japan 11 13 10 - 22.0 
SOURCE: Bl and Foreign Economic Trends Report, U. s. 
Embassy, Nairobi (Foreign Investment in a 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































SOURCE: Economic History of Kenya and Uganda 1800-1970 by 
zwananberg and King, p. 244. 
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APPENDIX 5 
Expansion of Inter-Territorial Trade in E. Africa 
(KE millions) 
Ken~ QS,anda Tanzania Total 
1944 1. 09 1. 98 0.66 3.73 
1948 1. 93 3.19 0.83 5.95 
1951 3.72 4.31 1.15 9.18 
1954 5.81 7.54 1.04 11.49 
1957 11. 43 5.32 2.02 18.77 
1960 13.77 6.69 2.33 22.79 
1963 19.80 8.24 2.43 31. 47 
1966 28.90 10.45 4.65 44.00 
SOURCE: van zwanenberg and King, "East Africa and Economic 
Federation: The East African Common Market• (An 
Economic History of Kenya and Uganda 1800-1970). 
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APPENDIX 6 
Differential Pricing of Agricultural Products 
Average Unit Values in External and Inter-Territorial 
Exports in East Africa, 1962 
Commodity Overseas Uganda Tanzania 
Beef and veal 7.8 9.8 10.5 
Bacon, Ham and Pork 15.1 21.8 18.4 
Ahee 15.8 19.7 18.4 
Butter 11.5 17.2 17.7 
Cheese 13.0 14.6 14.6 
Biscuits 8.8 10.2 104. 
SOURCE: D. G. R. Belshaw, Agricultural Production and Trade 
in the East African Common Market (Federation in 
East Africa by Leys & Robson, p. 84). 
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APPENDIX 7 
Estimated Book Value of Foreign Investments 
in Kenya in 1972 
132 
countrz KEM % of Total 
United Kingdom 87 67 
United states 26 20 
Germany 6 5 
France 5 4 
Japan 1 2 
TOTAL 130 100 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Basic Firms in Kenya by Ownership 
and Employment Level 1974-1975 
Industry Firm No. Number Employed 
Paper Products l* 422 
2 71 
3* 75 
Printing and Publishing l* 301 
2* 276 
3 105 
Basic Chemicals l* 75 
2* 36 
3 10 
soap l* 655 
2* 64 
3 54 
Miscellaneous Chemicals l* 113 
2* 71 
3* 60 
Non-metal Mineral Products l* 456 
2* 310 
3 156 
*Means a multinational corporation. 
SOURCE: Ministry of Labor, Eastern Africa Economic Review, 
Volume 8, Number 2, December 1976, p. 49. 
APPENDIX 10 
Percentage of Gross Product 
By Foreign ownership 
Mining and Quarrying 
Manufacturing and Repairs 









source: Census of Industrial Production for 1907-72, Cen-









Number of Private Companies 

























Source: Annual returns of the Registrar General, summary 

































































































































































































































































































































































































Previous Occupation of Market Businessmen 
Occuption Before Taking Profit Under Prof it 
Up Business 300/- p.m. 300/- p.m. + All 
Farming 17% 15% 17% 
Employed: 
Unskilled 18% 10% 16% 
Skilled manual 23% 27% 25% 
Clerical, teaching 15% 21% 17% 
Army, police 4% 6% 4% 
At school 6% 5% 5% 
In detention 1% 1% 1% 
Hawker or petty trader 8% 9% 8% 
No occupation 8% 6% 7% 
TOTAL % 100% 100% 100% 
* 
TOTAL NO. 445 178 786* 
Including businesses where profit could not be esti-
mated, but excluding one market where the question on 
previous occupation was not asked. 
source: Morris and Somerset, p. 245. 
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APPENDIX 14 
World Trade in Millions (£ ) EX£Orts* 1960s 
Year Kenya u~anda Tanzania 
1964 53.40 66.45 70.25 
1965 51.87 63.95 62.93 
1966 62.16 67.12 83.90 
1967 59.28 65.54 79.11 
1968 62.63 66.35 81.10 
*Trade between Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania excluded. 
SOURCE: Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, Department of 
Economics and Social Affairs, statistical Office, 




World Trade in Millions (£) Im£orts* 1960s 
Year Kenya usanda Tanzania 
1964 76.53 32.77 43.96 
1965 88.95 40.85 50.01 
1966 112.23 42.90 64.20 
1967 106.51 41.29 65.02 
1968 114.84 43.80 76.58 
*Trade between Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania excluded. 
SOURCE: Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, Department of 
Economics and Social Affairs, Statistical Office, 




National Income in Millions (£) Market Prices 1960s 
Year Kenya Uganda Tanzania* 
1959 215 149 
1960 226 152 173 
1961 225 156 181 
1962 244 157 186 
1963 329 176 211 
1964 352 195 226 
1965 359 223 228 
1966 410 243 252 
1967 440 381 283 
1968 478 328 293 
*Tanzania shillings converted into pounds. 
SOURCE: Monthly Bulletin of statistics, Department of 
Economics and Social Affairs, statistical Office, 
United Nations, New York (1968, pp. 178-179 and 
1972, pp. 186 and 187). 
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APPENDIX 17 
World Trade in Millions (Shillings) Imports* 1970s 
Year Kenia Uganda Tanzania 
1972 3957 1158 2956 
1973 4571 1139 3479 
1974 7679 1556 5258 
1975 7253 1469 5694 
1976 8140 1325 5421 
1977 10626 1992 6161 
1978 13223 1963 8581 
1979 12386 1472 8885 
1980 19181 2175 10046 
*Does not include trade between Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. 
SOURCE: Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, Department of 
Economics and Social Affairs, Statistical Office, 
United Nations, New York, 1985, pp. 148 and 164. 
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APPENDIX 18 
World Trade in Millions (Shillings) Exports* 1970s 
Year Kenia_ Uganda Tanzania 
1972 2654 2019 2277 
1973 3614 2206 2587 
1974 4714 2331 2861 
1975 4761 1977 2764 
1976 6901 3002 4007 
1977 9893 4859 4471 
1978 7915 2682 3669 
1979 8269 3246 4216 
1980 10314 2558 4161 
*Does not include trade between Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. 
SOURCE: Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, Department of 
Economics and Social Affairs, statistical Office, 
United Nations, New York, 1985, pp. 148 and 164. 
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APPENDIX 19 
National Income (Millions of Shillin~s) 1970s 
Year Kenya* Uganda Tanzania 
1969 10418 8300 8271 
1970 11454 9400 9173 
1971 12707 1043 9792 
1972 14516 - 11270 
1973 16652 - 13184 
1974 20452 - 15644 
*Kenya pounds converted into shillings. 
SOURCE: Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, Department of 
Economics and Social Affairs, Statistical Office, 
United Nations, New York, 1977 (pp. 187 and 189. 
